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ABSTRACT 
An alternative vww of the existing world order is adopted, since, 
it is argued, the orthodox view (of a benevolent First World 
tirelessly engaging the development problems of a Third) is 
illusory. The parlous condition of debt-ridden Third World 
countries is explained by locating them within the confines of this 
order and drawing an interrelationship between their lack of 
beneficial development and the rapid deterioration of their 
environments. Some of the mechanisms by which the now 
unrestrained western economic system are examined where the 
residents of one hemisphere are 'managed' to service and support 
the profligate lifestyles of elites in the other. 
It is argued that a western order has straddled a reconstructed 
world economy since 1945 and has been sustained by the 
hegemonic power of the United States and its major industrial 
allies. It is further argued that the archaic exploitative nature of 
this order has rendered it inappropriate for new world conditions 
and the present general turmoil is a symptom of its decline. The 
world is moving from an old to a new set of imperatives, which 
must be socially-just and ecologically-benign. Thus movements 
for socio/economic justice and the environment can no longer be 
perceived as separate ends but as parts of the same larger global 
process. 
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PREFACE 
My intention throughout the research has been to understand at 
least some of the factors which have been important, perhaps 
decisive, in determining contemporary global relations between 
the rich and poor worlds. Although the initial point of interest 
came from a growing concern for the state of the local and 
international environment, the futility of separating inextricably-
connected environmental and development issues became 
obvious. Jiqually clear was ~ihe conclusion that attempts to alter 
the deteriorating condition of the planet will not succeed before 
serious attention is paid to the inequitable conditions under which 
the majority of the human race is forced to exist, was equally 
clear. And because Third World debt is one of the essential pillars 
supporting the western world order, its resolution will be difficult 
while the same order persists and while an excessive consumption 
in the rich world generates poverty in the rest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The factors that have typically driven policy are the need to 
Impose or maintain a global system that will serve state 
power and the closely-linked interests of the masters of the 
private economy and to ensure its viability by means of 
public subsidy and a state-guaranteed market (Chomsky 
1991:2). 
It is difficult to state with certainty whether we are expenencmg 
an interregnum (Enzensberger 1990: 155) during a "unipolar 
moment" (Layne 1993:32) between world orders in the cycles of 
political, economic and cultural hegemony. There is wide 
agreement however, that this is a time of change and uncertainty 
associated with the declining hegemonic status of the United 
States and the disintegration of the USSR (the bipolar system). 
State power appears to be in decline under pressure of growth in 
the private sector and the emergence of the so-called 'global 
market'. Both tendencies are said to contribute to persistent geo-
political and geo-economic disorder (O'Tuathail 1992:437). But 
this situation may be short-lived as new great powers emerge, 
structurally-driven by the twin factors of differential growth 
rates and international anarchy (Layne 1993:9). 
After World War II, the United States extended the economic 
connections between the countries of the 'free world' and as 
hegemon, was well-placed to co-ordinate and control them. For 
Layne, United States policy-makers had made definite plans for 
what was to be an "American Century": 
American strategy aimed at achieving a "preponderance of 
power" in the international system. Washington sought to 
incorporate Western Europe, West Germany and Japan into 
an American-led alliance; create an open economy that 
would permit the unfettered movement of goods, capital 
and technology; and create an international environment 
conducive to America's democratic values (Layne 1993 :33 ). 
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This made possible almost three decades of growth and prosperity 
(the long boom). But since the late 1960s, both have stalled 
coinciding with a multitude of morbid symptoms in the world 
generally. These have included an almost universal state of 
economic and political insecurity. In the absence of a fully-
accredited hegemon, corporate power has been advanced in the 
accelerated growth of the market particularly in the spheres of 
international financial services·. This has been accompanied by a 
consolidation of wealth in the hands of rich elites. The agenda of 
the so-called 'New Right', attempting to undo the social, economic 
and political gains of the last sixty years (Corbridge 1992:286). 
Perhaps the spectacular increase in the numbers of world poor in 
the last two decades is not an unrelated phenomenon, as Ekins 
observes: 
... the 50 per cent of some developing country populations 
who have not only been bypassed by mainstream 
development but are being systematically impoverished by 
it, or the part of the population of the 'free market' 
industrial countries, up to 20 per cent in the US and UK, who 
languish fixedly below the poverty line. These disposable 
people are not a new : phenomenon of capitalist 
industrialisation, rather they are one of its most enduring 
features (Ekins 1992:202). 
This thesis traces the beginning of the current world order to the 
end of World War II as historical context for the development, 
extent and maintenance of the Third World debt crisis and its 
ongoing social/environmental costs. 
Chapter One scans the events surrounding the establishment of 
this western order under the hegemony of the United .States, an 
era coinciding with the Bretton Woods capitalist economic system. 
Both have declined after a somewhat short reign, upwards of 
thirteen to fourteen years from the late 1950s to the early 1970s 
(Hirst and Thompson 1992:360). This era also coincided with 
periods of 'inter-systemic rivalry' known as the 'Cold War' 
between two empires (American and Soviet), for access to the 
resources and markets of less-developed countries. 
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Chapter Two traces the major factors contributing to the declining 
predominance of the United States and the rising power of its 
economic competitors. It highlights some of the main causes of 
economic decline, namely the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s and the 
inadequate responses of western powers to the more important 
oil crisis of 197 8-7 9. 
American reassertiveness in a unipolar world was an underlying 
reason among those which drew the 'world' to war in the Persian 
Gulf in 1990. Chapter Three argues that this 'incident' was more 
than a piece of adventurism motivated by economic and political 
self-interest. It was an act of discipline exercised by the United 
States and its major allies upon an increasingly recalcitrant Third 
World. 
Chapter Four looks at some of the competing explanations for the 
present turmoil in international political and economic relations. 
This is considered to be an important part of the background to 
the current Third World debt and associated environmental crises. 
Chapter Five traces the sources, development and proliferation of 
the debt crisis. Of particular interest are the effects of the OPEC 
oil increases in the 1970s on the economies of Third World 
countries. This chapter also contains an analysis of the 
inadequacies of western development models, and highlights the 
role of the World Bank, the IMF and other lending and aid 
institutions. 
policies by the above institutions and 
social/environmental effects. 
of poor lending 
the resulting 
Chapter Six examines the close links between Third World 
indebtedness and the profligate waste of environmental 
resources, especially forests. It focuses on the agenda behind the 
recent push to finalise the GATT Round, its connection with the 
Third World debt crisis and the likely social, political and 
environmental effects. 
By way of conclusion, the final chapter looks at factors commg 
into play in the waning years of the late twentieth century which 
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are likely to exert influence on the future of people and planet, 
and seeks to find reasons for justifying a small degree of 
confidence. 
INTRODUCTION P4 
CHAPTER ONE 
POST-WAR HEGEMONY. 
1.1 Introduction 
For almost three decades after the end of World War II, the 
United States was both militarily and economically pre-eminent. 
It had played a decisive role in bringing hostilities to an end and 
was widely acclaimed the saviour of the old world and the 
liberator of the new. But 1945 was not simply the end of a war. 
It was the emphatic end of a British hegemony on the wane since 
the turn of the nineteenth century (Layne 1993:28). The war had 
revived an American economy drained by the depression years. 
It brought prosperity and recovery. In contrast to ravaged 
Europe, America had high production, consumption and 
employment. More importantly, it led in the important fields of 
military and scientific technology (Vaizey 1983 :28), thereby 
ensuring its hegemony. 
1.2 The Orthodox Cold War 
The term most commonly used to characterise the predominant 
geopolitical situation from 1945 to 1990, is Cold War. This was a 
long period of sustained global insecurity supposedly induced by 
the threat of general extinction. America was a dominant 
superpower, whose estabiished order was claimed to be 
constantly under challenge by the USSR (Taylor 1992: 11 ). Yet 
the Soviet Union was very weak in the early post-war years. 
World War II had been a holocaust in which the loss of life within 
its borders is thought to have been in the order of twenty million 
(Calvocoressi 1982:4 ). There had also been widespread 
destruction and displacement of industry and distortion of 
industrial patterns to the detriment of everything except war 
production. Because the war had devastated and depopulated 
much of the Soviet Union's cultivated land, food production was 
almost halved (Calvocoressi 1982:4 ). Consequently, some have 
argued that the European war against Germany was largely fought 
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and, in terms of human life, paid for by the Russian people 
(Anderson 1992: 41). 
After 1945, these historical facts were quickly set aside by the 
United States and its allies. Their diplomatic history up to 1941 
and their respective attitudes to international political, social and 
economic problems, suggest they had little in common with the 
Russians before and after the war (Calvocoressi 1982:3 ). The 
rivalry therefore derived its strength from an inter-systemic 
character between two very different social, economic and 
political systems which began in 1917 with the onset of the 
Communist Revolution and the exclusion of western capitalism 
from Soviet Eastern Europe (Halliday 1990:6-7). This rivalry 
accelerated as the Americans proceeded to organise the new 
world in their own interest - from a position of strength. At 
Bretton Woods, a number of innovative institutional mechanisms 
were set up to "manage" a revived international economy in the 
new world conditions. There was a semi-fixed paper dollar 
standard for exchange rates; the World Bank and the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) for monetary discipline and 
liquidity; and the mechanism of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) for multilateral trade negotiation. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence suggests that the Bretton Woods 
economic order primarily served the interests of the United 
States, whose hegemony it underpinned. Hirst and Thompson 
(1992) argue that the present problems of the world-wide 
economy are consequently linked with the declining economic 
status of this country. 
After Bretton Woods, America stood to gain much by becoming 
creditor to most of the war-ravaged world (through its superior 
export power). During the years that followed, President 
Truman's self-confessed dilemma was not whether to make 
political use of the new weapon, but to what political end he 
should use it (Calvocoressi 1982:7). A line was drawn between 
Eastern and Western Europe where American policy was initially 
containment of Communist expansion and, because the economic 
and political stability of Western Europe and Japan were critical to 
this policy, the United States was willing to forego the 
"maximisation of its relative gains and pursue instead a policy of 
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absolute gains for all members of the anti-Soviet coalition" (Stein 
1984:355). Essentially this meant that America was willing to 
exchange the hegemon's prerogative of enriching itself at the cost 
of its allies for the strategic benefits of their economic and 
political stability and the success of its containment policy. 
In the late 1940s, the Korean War further strained relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and containment 
became globalised to underscore the portrayal of a masterly 
socialist conspiracy for conquering the world (Calvocoressi 
1982: 15-16). America advocated and supported a string of 
regional alliances to ring the USSR and China, from NATO in 
Western Europe through CENTO in the Middle-East to SEATO in 
South-East Asia (O'Loughlin 1989:305). By 1953, the American 
nuclear monopoly was more or less ended when the USSR 
achieved a nuclear capacity. 
The economic and social dimensions of the Cold War allowed the 
creation of a consensual politics of growth in post-war America (0' 
Tuathail 1992: 439). By exaggerating the threat of an expanding 
Communist empire, United States foreign policy makers were able 
to transform the country from a reluctant isolationist power into a 
crusading protector of an open world economy and free enterprise 
system which flourished under the conditions of a bipolar 
international system (Layne 1991 :45). The open-market system 
continues to be of major importance for the United States and its 
major allies. This point was made clear by the US Secretary of 
Defense Cheney in 1992: 
We are a trading nation, and our prosperity is linked to peace 
and stability in the world. Simply stated, the world-wide 
market that we're part of cannot thrive where regional 
violence, instability, and aggression put it at peril c (Dick 
r"t.~~~.. TTC' C',.~ .. ,.,.a .. " ,..,..f n.,..r,...,,.,. ~" L"'yn"" 190'1·'\n'l \.._..llCillVJ, UU U\.1\,..;l\.tl- lJ V.i. .1......'\..1.1.\.fii()V' J.J.I. U. J. v .I. ./.J.., •. nv}• 
1.3 The Real Cold War 
The superpower conflict of the conventional portrayal after 1945, 
between the USSR and the US, was only fractionally real. In part 
it was a device to mobilise a reluctant population in fear of an 
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enemy supposedly dedicated to its destruction. Equally for the 
USSR, it served as a means of motivating the support of its 
satellites. But for the US it was primarily an economic war, fought 
for access to the resources of the Third World 
Internationally, the United States relied on an imposed deterrence 
system through NATO in Western Europe and the Mutual Security 
Treaty with Japan, to incorporate America's major capitalist allies 
into an economic alliance (Barnett 1983 ). Thus a convergence of 
interests among the ruling elites in all three regions facilitated the 
establishment of an American 'empire by invitation' (Lundestad 
1990). It was also this same policy which allowed the United 
States: 
to establish for itself the freedom, in the space which 
became demarcated as the 'Third World', to intervene and to 
attack peoples and states US national security elites 
considered a threat to their version of 'American' values, 
institutions and economic interests (Chomsky 1991:28 ). 
In the less-developed countries, : super-power 'disputes' were 
resolved by proxy (Layne 1993:44) in protracted but limited 
bloody wars (Korea, Vietnam, Angola and Afghanistan), often in 
battles between popular liberation movements and counter-
insurgency United States-backed forces. Between 1945 and 1989 
there were 269 American military actions (supposedly) aimed at 
the containment of the USSR whose 'puppets' were said to be a 
threat to fragile democracies in developing countries and the 
legitimate interests of the free world (O'Loughlin 1989:305). This 
kind of aggressive western policy seemed to characterise the 
post-war period till the 1990s, one which incorporated another 
assumption, namely that developing countries were m need of 
protection from expansionist superpowers. 
Chomsky argues that there are really two versions of the Cold 
War, an 'orthodox' and a 'real' one. According to US propaganda, 
there could be no co-existence with the USSR, which was held to 
be the aggressor throughout. Only five years after the Soviets 
faced annihilation in World War II, they were to be reconstituted 
within a US-dominated alliance, itself committed to the 
CHAPTER 1 p8 
elimination of the Soviet system. By its very nature, such a 
system constituted an unacceptable challenge. Its autarkic 
command economy defied American business plans to build a 
global system based on force, trade and investment (Chomsky 
1991 :38). The Communist Revolution had put an end to western 
hopes of a world united by capital (Sampson 1982:44 ). 
1.4 Democracy For The Few 
The role of the Third World was purely functional in the 
American post-war world. It served the needs of the industrial 
countries. South-East Asia was essential as a storehouse of raw 
materials and as a market for the products of western Europe and 
Japan - hence the necessity for "police actions" in Korea, Vietnam 
and Iraq. The major policy imperative was to block indigenous 
nationalist forces that might try to use their own resources in 
conflict with American interests (Chomsky 1991.54). 
In the Middle-East the implications of this policy have been of the 
greatest importance for world pe~ce. This, the world's most 
energy-rich area, has evoked the greatest fears in United States 
planners. 'Security' has been equated with the ability to restrain 
unfriendly nationalist forces threatening western control of the 
oil-producing region. Saudi Arabian elites and the Israeli state 
continue to be considered appropriate partners in assisting terror 
and subversion in the Third World (Chomsky 1991:55). This is a 
v1ew shared by O'Loughlin: 
U.S force will probably be only used against Third World 
states that threaten "vital US or Western interests". Oil is 
clearly one of these interests and as the US conservatives 
argue, control of it by an opposing state is a legitimate 
realpolitical reason to go to war (O'Loughlin 1992:26; see 
also O'Tuathail 1992:440). 
By 1989, the Soviet geo-political order was no longer viable. It 
had not been as attractive as the one established in western 
Europe by the US (Migone 1987) for whom the end of the Soviet 
empire meant the end of a useful pretext with which to justify the 
maintenance of a neo-colonialist order in the weakest areas of the 
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Third World. According to Chomsky, the end of bipolarity has 
exposed the reality behind orthodox Cold War rhetoric: 
The problem of the disappearing pretext was recognised 
years ago, but the efforts of the 1980's to overcome it 
invoking lunatic Arab terrorists or Hispanic narco-
traffickers, for example, have too short a half-life to be truly 
effective. It therefore becomes necessary to acknowledge 
that the Third World itself is the real enemy (Chomsky 
1991:32-33 ). 
The real Cold War, waged against and for the submission and 
exploitation of developing countries (initially in the interest of 
American business elites and now for the benefit of global 
corporations) can continue. For United States policy planners, the 
threat of communist domination of the democratic world, obsolete 
long before the dissolution of the USSR, has meant a search for 
new enemies, readily supplied in the rising power of militant 
Islamic states such as Iraq. This "major candidate for the prime 
evil of our times" (Springborg 1992:16), according to the Gulf War 
rhetoric of George Bush and seriously entertained by certain 
analysts (Taylor 1992: 12), surpasses the ideological threat of 
Communism. In 1990, this it was sufficient to call the world to 
arms against Iraq. But it lacked credibility according to some 
observers: 
In sum, the United States administration put forward the 
New World Order to pre-empt a discourse of peace. Instead 
of euphoric celebration of victory over the Soviet Union, and 
open discussion of distribution of the benefits of peace, we 
were instructed that evil had mutated into a new, more 
virulent form that required yet greater vigilance on our 
part. Peace dividends would have to be. deferred 
(Spring borg 1992: 15). 
This short-lived New World Order Is dealt with more expansively 
in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AMERICA HEGEMONISING BEYOND ITS MEANS 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a good deal of agreement that the unravelling of the 
American post-war order began with its changing fortunes in the 
1960s when dominance of the world's economic, and political 
systems had begun to erode. (O'Loughlin 1989:297). One very 
influential viewpoint, the "imperial overstretch thesis" 
(Kennedy: 1987), argues that in the period 1968-1972, the United 
States entered into decline as military over-commitment and 
economic stagnation combined to produce a country less equipped 
to meet economic competition from Europe and Asia. Another 
popular view (among conservatives) denies the idea of hegemonic 
decline completely (Nye 1990; Nau 1990), attributing American 
econom1c problems to mistaken policies and the lack of 
authoritative leadership. This view leans heavily on the United 
States' economic growth in the mid-1980s and the subsequent 
military re-as serti veness under the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, both of which were largely underwritten with 
foreign loans and 'donations'. (O'Loughlin 1990:27). 
For Agnew, the above views are inadequate analyses of the 
American position. Heavily indebted and with a deteriorating 
infrastructure, its territorial economy has been undermined by 
policies geared increasingly towards transnationalised American 
business interests (Agnew 1990:8). On the other hand, a liberal 
perspective argues that geo-economics will replace geo-politics 
and that the United States will continue to be economically 
disadvantaged until it is able to respond to the challenges from 
regional trading blocs and the 'unfair' trading practices of its 
competitors (Agnew 1990:7). 
The declining status of the United States has meant that changes 
in global economic, political and cultural conditions, no longer lie 
solely within the control of United States policymakers. Long 
cycle models (Gilpin 1981) claim that America could not compete 
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economically with Japan, Western Europe and the Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICS), while it had to remain militarily 
superior to the old USSR. For Gilpin, imperial decline is 
attributable to a consistent set of factors: 
(1) External burdens of leadership resulting in costly 
expenditures; 
(2) An external secular tendency towards nsmg consumption, 
thereby reducing infrastructural investment; and 
(3) The international diffusion of technology which bridges the 
gap between the initial advantage of the leading state and its 
lagging competitors. 
The United States has not managed to remam sufficiently 
competive to maintain an unthreatened hegemonic position. 
While fixed capital investment has been higher among its 
industrialised rivals, in the US, military and private consumption 
has been excessive. Thus Burstein argues that the stage is already 
set for a power shift towards Japan. He claims that Americans 
suffer from a general lack of comprehension regarding the 
seriousness of their economic predicament, so that: 
When America finally wakes, it will be the morning after 
when it is too late. Americans will face a country that has 
let its infrastructure crumble, its foreign markets decline, its 
productivity dwindle, its savings evaporate and its budget 
and borrowings burgeon (Burstein 1988:24). 
Burstein warns that, to a large extent, Japanese capit.al already 
controls American interest rates, the financing of government 
operations and the flow of imports and exports. Japan, he claims, 
has won the trade war and is well on 
area of financial competition for 
bloodstream." This is a battle which it 
the way to victory in the 
control of the "body's 
will ultimately win in the 
twenty-first century because it has been sufficiently astute to 
enjoy the benefits of leadership without paying for the rest of the 
world's "security and development". Layne is less concerned 
about the resurgence of Japan to great power status because, iike 
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Germany, it cannot be considered a great power since it lacks the 
requisite military capabilities, especially strategic nuclear arsenals 
for deterrence self-sufficiency (Layne 1993:5). But this is likely 
to be only a temporary situation (see chapter 4, p.26) as far as 
Japanese rearmament is concerned. It is also quite possible that 
there are others such as China, vying to fill the power vaccuum in 
a high-growth area: 
China will be a strong contender for great power status if it 
can maintain its internal cohesion. Buoyed by its vibrant 
economy, China has embarked on a major modernisation 
and expansion of its air, naval and ground forces, including 
its power-projection capabilities (Kristof 1993, cited in 
Layne 1993:5). 
2.2 The Beginning Of Decline 
Affluence, stationary prices and low inflation made the 1960s an 
economic success story which coincided with a strong faith in 
capitalism, technology and science. But these conditions could not 
be sustained for long. In the , mid-1960s, discontent spread 
around the industrialised world, beginning in the United States. It 
signalled the end of an 'idyllic' period. There were fierce 
controversies and clashes over Black Rights and the Free Speech 
Movement at Berkeley with further dissent over American 
involvement in the Vietnam War, especially the bombing of North 
Vietnam after 1965. But the single most significant year in this 
'decade of dissent' was 1968, a year that saw a torrent of activity 
on the global stage. America contended with a Black Power 
Movement and the asassination of Martin Luther King. In 
Vietnam it was the My Lae massacre of Vietnamese civilians by 
American troops and, finally, the North Vietnamese Tet ·Offensive. 
In Europe, it was the Paris student revolt. By 1969, America had 
very serious problems, with US authority under siege nationally 
and internationally. Repression of blacks, students and other 
minorities was equated with the repression of the Vietnamese 
specifically and the Third World in general. In the same year the 
world economy showed a decline, as did America's GNP. It meant 
recession and further woes, signalled by Nixon's break with the 
gold standard. This had serious long-term effects because the 
United States, along with its European allies, failed to devise ·an 
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international monetary mechanism to replace that which had 
collapsed (Vaizey 1983:397). The result was monetary instability 
and further decline in the prestige of the United States. 
2.3 The "Shocking" Price Of Oil 
In 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
unilaterally raised the price of crude oil by a factor of four, and in 
1979 it doubled the new price. These acts were initially 
perceived as statements of symbolic importance in a new era of 
assertiveness for the Third World. Oil-producing countries 
demanded more power over their valuable commodity, thus 
weakening the western world's monopoly over the resources of 
the developing world (Odell 1986:288). 
Post-war prosperity in the West had been largely subsidised by 
the availability of this cheap and versatile fuel, and for major 
industrial nations such as the US, its availability was of 
considerable importance to the. closely-linked interests of 
business and state (Odell 1986:27). By 1973, the oil companies 
had contributed over $2500 billion towards the balance of 
payments (Odell 1986:27). After 1974, there was a deterioration 
in both foreign remittances and US balance of payments. The 
pnce of crude rose by 400 per cent. 
It is necessary to note that although commercial considerations 
were important, there have been wider issues involved in the 
politics of oil. America was and remains concerned for the 
security of international oil supplies both for itself and its allies. 
According to Chomsky, the availability of cheap supplies and 
indeed other Third World commodities, have been an integral part 
of the United States post-war order and have therefore required 
close protection by the West: 
It has always been a guiding policy that Middle-East oil 
should be under the control of the US, its allies and clients 
and its oil corporations and that independent radical 
influences are not to be tolerated (Chomsky1991: 179). 
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Yet in 1973, for a number of reasons, such international 
disobedience was tolerated. Political, cultural, and economic 
events had coalesced in a way to produce quite profound changes 
in US foreign policy. Vaizey explains: 
The position of the United States in the mid-70s was central 
to the collapse of western morale and ideology .. more 
fundamental, possibly, was the retreat of America from a 
positive, crusading spirit of free enterprise and free 
institutions to a morally defensive attitude to communism 
and towards the nationalism of the Third World, where 
liberal institutions were rare (Vaizey 1983:392). 
2.4 Multinationals And Oil Power 
For the international oil companies, the Middle-East had been an 
El Dorado. Concession areas allowed them almost total 
sovereignty, including the right to explore without hindrance. In 
return, they were asked to pay a small royalty and some share of 
the huge profits, that share being completely determined by the 
way they managed their books (Odell 1986:34 ). At the end of 
1973 this cosy arrangement carne to a sudden halt, when most of 
the oil-producing members of OPEC unilaterally asserted the right 
to take whatever decisions they liked m the ownership, 
production and price of oil, without the approval of the oil 
compames. Inevitably this meant demanding a higher price for 
oil, but who was to pay for the price hikes? Importing countries 
were vulnerable either way. Restrictions, let alone stoppages, 
would jeopardise their industry and daily life; price increases 
would disfigure their balance of payments. In the end, the 
problem was shunted onto the backs of consumers who were 
locked into fossil fuel consumption and would thus pay ·the higher 
prices. The situation of the companies was somewhat di~ferent. 
They suffered only in that restrictions and stoppages harmed 
their profits; higher prices did not (Calvocoressi 1982:34). The oil 
companies recognised that their best interests were served by co-
operating with the now powerful oil producers (Odell 1986:110) 
and allowing OPEC to be blamed for the steep increases. Thus the 
companies simply increased their profits and refused to absorb 
even part of the additional costs (Odell 1986: Ill). 
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It is important to note that consumer nations had also failed to 
see the significance of the steadily rising power of OPEC after 
1960 (the date of its formation). Little attempt was made to 
respond to this threat by adopting measures to reduce the cost of 
imports. The combined power of OPEC and the oil companies 
seemed formidable as they proceeded to syphon off billions of 
petro-dollars from western economies and those of the vulnerable 
developing world. 
As noted, 1973 saw increasing tension m the fixed exchange rates 
between international currencies. The floating and devaluation in 
the American dollar intensified economic uncertainty, whilst 
soaring prices in wheat and fuel indicated in extreme form what 
was happening in other basic commodities (Blainey 1988:252). 
Between 1971 and 197 4, the price index of world commodities 
rose from 1 per cent to 68 per cent. Wage demands added more 
pressure. Western economies seemed to be in a spiral. Till 197 4, 
Germany was the only country able to keep inflation below 10 per 
cent. In the UK, it reached 24 per cent. The effects of high oil 
prices permeated throughout these economies, affecting the cost 
of everything. Speculation in high-demand commodities further 
added to rising costs at a time when prosperity (in the early 
1970s) was still expected to continue indefinitely. But the 
movement of wealth out of public hands (especially in higher fuel 
costs) to the private accounts of the rich (in Western banks) had 
begun to accelerate once again. 
momentum. 
The recession was gathering 
It would be difficult to overstate the damage done to the world 
economy during the climactic years of the early 1970s. Lulled by 
a false sense of security and affluence in the 1950s and 1960s 
(the long boom), the affluent world was unprepared for the" return 
of the old malaises. Soaring prices, shortages, strikes, 
unemployment and currency disiocations suddenly returned to 
plague western economies. The vital industrial sector, the 
linchpin of its economies, suffered a heavy blow (the area of 
motor vehicle manufacture was especially hard hit) as did 
business confidence. It was the end of an era. Wealth began to 
retreat to its traditional home in the coffers of the elites, an 
unremarkable phenomenon during periods of recession. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ALMOST 'NEW' WORLD ORDER (OF GEORGE BUSH) 
3.1 Introduction 
By the end of the 1970s, the briefly-won improvement in the 
bargaining power of Third World countries were wound back. 
Any hope of North-South cooperation embodied in the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) of the UN declaration were 
fading quickly. Commodity prices had plummeted and developing 
countries began to feel the serious effects of heavy debt. The net 
transfer of resources to the rich industrial North varied between 
$20-$100 billion dollars per year (Khor 1992:25). It was status 
quo ante. The power to determine world economic events 
returned to the North, and concentrated in the hands of the Group 
of 7 major powers while the South was split between the newly-
industrialising countries (NICS) and the indebted poverty-stricken 
remainder. A neocolonial strategy of 'divide and rule' proved 
effective in the 'case by case' approach of the IMF in managing 
the debt crisis of the 1980s. These were years in which 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) expanded widely in a 
weakened Third World then competing within itself for foreign 
investment. TNCs were also behind the recent GATT push to 
remove all trade restrictions worldwide (see Chapter Six). By the 
1990s, many poor countries were exhausted by debt and 
commodity problems, and without the support of a Soviet Union, 
had fewer options to improve their collective positions. 
This was the context for the 'Gulf Action' of 1990, when President 
Bush of the United States proclaimed a new era of international 
justice and cooperation: 
A new world struggling to be born, a world quite different 
from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law 
supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations 
recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, 
a world where the strong respect the weak. (Bush, cited in 
Evans 1991: 1). 
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It was a vam attempt to elaborate the nature of a brave New 
World Order, a long-awaited new age beyond rivalry, beyond the 
Cold War and beyond injustice. But behind the elevating rhetoric 
loomed yet another high-handed international adventure. As 
Senator Gareth Evans, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs 
rightly notes, one may be excused for a certain amount of 
cymc1sm when confronted with a new order promoting 
democratic practices; the consolidation of free market economiCs; 
collective resistance to aggression; and the upholding of universal 
values (Evans 1991: 1). Nevertheless, in spite of the shortcomings 
of a 'global plan' which focuses simply on the issue of security, 
Evans could still muster some optimism, because "it is not a bad 
place to start" (Evans 1991 :2). The UN's collective security 
obligation so dramatically discharged in the Iraq-Kuwait tragedy, 
had depended largely on the willingness of the United States and 
its allies to go down the same road again. Unfortunately these 
assurances do not offer a very firm foundation for international 
security as borne out by the reluctance of the UN to show similar 
determination in the Balkans and many other 'trouble spots'. The 
struggles of disposessed minorities and majorities, also supported 
by UN resolutions in occupied Palestine, East Timor, West Papua, 
Cyprus and South Africa, cannot hope for the same degree of 
enthusiastic support from a US-propelled UN action. Such places 
simply do not posess the necessary inducements to an 
"enlightened self-interest" and consequently no hope of a US 
rescue m1ss10n. Nevertheless, Evans (1991 :4) maintains that the 
American role is crucial for "nourishing and maintaining the UN 
system". An alternative explanation is perhaps that, having itself 
·barely survived the Cold War contest, the United States, now in 
economic decline, 1s compensating with increased and 
unchallenged military action (Chomsky 1991:3; Spring borg 
1992: 15). There is a new world political/military equation in 
which America remains pre-eminent and whose assent must be 
given whenever the UN undertakes a particular action. The really 
important decisions of the UN are made in the US-dominated 
Security Council rather than the democratic General Assembly, 
where the will of the majority is rarely in accord with that of the 
United States and its allies. Urquhart argues cogently that self 
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interest 1s insufficient to justify the course of action taken in the 
Persian Gulf: 
It is no longer acceptable that international action is taken 
only when a situation threatens the interests of the most 
powerful nations (Urquhart 1991:17) 
A viable system of international peace and security, then, must be 
comprehensive and universal, equally protecting the interests of 
the weak and the poor. 
For Darling (1991:31), Bush's attempt to imagine a global security 
system was clearly inadequate. It was designed to "encourage" 
the world into another war, a ploy to reinforce the privileged 
position of the West, a position fortified within the structure of 
the UN Security Council which has been dominated by the US and 
its allies for almost half a century. In this way, the UN's 
reputation as an independent arbiter has been seriously 
compromised. 
The view that powerful world interests routinely take precedence 
over the rights of weaker ones is echoed by Braithwaite, who 
claims the world has little choice at present, simply because: 
One nation, the US, will be the policeman. Hegemony of the 
American interests is the only world order on offer. The 
Gulf War can certainly be interpreted as support for this 
v1ew (Braithwaite 1991:58). 
3.2 The Right To Be 'Human' In The New World Order 
UN and United States policymakers continue to be preoccupied 
with asserting their power over a recalcitrant government i.n Iraq 
while neglecting the structural violence their policies inflict on 
civilian populations. The plight of millions of homeless Kurds and 
starving Iraqis has not inspired quite the same degree of official 
moral outrage as the human rights of Kuwaiti subjects. America's 
eagerness for military solutions has created more problems for 
the inhabitants of the area than it has solved (Braithwaite 
1991:65). 
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In an analysis of the concern shown for human rights in the UN 
Security Council, Alston has noted the Council's failure to respond 
to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in 
1987 and 1988 (Alston 1991:87). 
Hoskins ( 1993: 8-9) from first hand experience and on the 
strength of a confidential report by the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority (AEA), has argued that radioactive bullets made 
from American nuclear waste was used by the coalition forces 
during the Gulf War. International medical experts have been 
alarmed by the fatal plague of post-war mysterious diseases in 
Iraqi children. Most common among these has been leukemia, 
almost certainly caused by contact with the thousands of 
radioactive bullets and shells known as 'depleted uramum 
penetrators' manufactured in the US and now strewn all over Iraq 
(Hoskins 1993:8). According to Hoskins the same AEA report 
refers to this clandestine nuclear war against Third World 
civilians as a 'significant problem', one that has dumped enough 
uranium in both Kuwait and Iraq to cause tens of thousands of 
deaths and: 
By shipping it overseas 'with the boys' in the form of 
depleted uranium penetrators, the West may have finally 
found the tool for the expedient disposal of radioactive 
nuclear waste (Hoskins 1993:9). 
It is also highly probable that the soil and drinking resources in 
vast areas of Iraq have become contaminated by the same 
radioactive waste. 
Not surprisingly, the Council consistently ignored the issue of 
human rights throughout the Gulf Crisis. Jansen (1992) argues 
that the UN Security Council has functioned as a sub-department 
of the US Department of State since 1990, most blatantly in the 
cases of Iraq and Libya. For these reasons it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that concern to streng~hen the international human 
rights regime was at best a marginal consideration and at worst a 
non-existent one in the context of the Gulf War. It is equally 
difficult to take the notion of a new order of peace and just~~e 
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seriously when it results in thousands of refugees, war-injured 
civilians and appalling environmental devastation. This point is 
taken up by Muzoffar (1991 :30) who notes the pragmatism and 
selectivity of the allies in the area of human rights. He points out 
that Northern governments have equated this concept with civil 
and political rights (and even this is selectively applied). What 
'freedom' can the New World Order offer if it fails to free the vast 
majority of the human race from hunger, disease and ignorance? 
For Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia (1992:26), it is 
imperative that a New World Order addresses the 'increasing 
inequity in the international economic system which has resulted 
in a widening gap between the rich nations of the North and the 
poor in the South'. A narrowed conception of human rights serves 
the interests of the rich and powerful, as it avoids the necessity to 
consider the economic, social and cultural problems of the 
underprivileged. A broader conception would threaten the 
maintenance of a world ordered for the benefit of the rich, oil-
dependent North (Muzoffar 1991:31). 
In the Middle East, power over oil resources was too important to 
be left in the hands of unfriendly states. The revival of western 
economies could not be countenanced without the assured 
supplies of the world's greatest sources of fossil fuel. Hence the 
haste with which the US precipitated war. According to Chomsky, 
the predominant view of the recent Gulf 'action' was perceived in 
the South as characteristic neo-colonialist behaviour: 
... the traditional warrior states the US and UK sought a 
regional Yalta where the powerful nations agree among 
themselves to a share of Arab spoils. Their conduct 
throughout this one month has revealed the seamiest side of 
Western civilization; its unrestricted appetite for dominance, 
its morbid fascination for hi-tech military might, its 
insensitivity for alien cultures, its appalling jingoism 
(Chomsky 1991 :407). 
According to Susan George (1992:23 ), the Gulf War was just 
another dose of discipline meted out to Iraq specifically and the 
Third World in general. The upstart Hussein had forgotten his 
place in the order of things. For Shiva, this New World Order is 
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another exercise in North-South relations during a period of 
severe crisis: 
I regard the New World Order basically as a sign of very 
deep insecurity among the powers that have controlled the 
world, its economy and its politics for the past few decades. 
They are feeling the threat of the erosion of this control 
(Shiva 1992:35). 
3.3 An Anti-New World Order 
As already noted, the economic decline of the United States is 
resulting in a compensatory increase in military and political 
assertiveness. This is a typical phenomenon in a post-hegemonic 
state, clearly observed in British foreign policy at the end of 
World War II (Taylor 1992:12). Britain's imperial status had been 
much diminished and the economy heavily indebted to the US. It 
is argued that American rhetoric for a New World Order was 
motivated by a similar need to shore up global confidence in a 
western system. Vietnam, Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, and 
economic decline in a period of prolonged depression and 
indebtedness have resulted in serious threats to domestic and 
international order. This is a realistic context for the Gulf War 
and the New World Order of George Bush. It was yet another 
attempt to re-establish the authority of an ageing hegemony over 
a world increasingly becoming multilateralised. According to Khor 
Kok Peng (1992:28-29), the economic rivalry between the 
Northern powers has intensified to the point at which they are not 
only investing and acquiring property within each other's 
territory, but colluding to further open up the markets of the 
Third World. They are resorting to bilateral and multi-lateral 
measures to prevent and obstruct the rise of NICs and · any other 
competitors. The resulting North-South relationship will be 
marked not by cooperation but by dictation. Ex-president Bush's 
observation that a new world order was being born was mere lip-
service to the fact that change was inevitable. Unfortunately 
subsequent United States' foreign policy responses in the Gulf and 
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in June 1992, have demonstrated a serious 
lack of imagination in the understanding of new world conditions. 
That the US no longer refers to a 'New World Order' in its global 
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rhetoric merely underlines the inadequacy and pragmatism of its 
world view. It cannot however deny the reality of a nascent 
socio/ecological order necessary for replacing the exploitative 
politico/economic hegemony of the last half century. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRESENT (DIS)ORDER 
4.1 Introduction 
There is much agreement that the 1980s were a critical time of 
transition from a bipolar geopolitical order to something which 
remains as yet unknown (Agnew and Corbridge 1989: 266), or 
which can be characterised as a temporarily unipolar one (Layne 
1993:7) which may yet turn out to be quite surprising (Taylor 
1989:1 0). Since the 1960s the world order has progressively 
become multi-polar, at least on the economic level (O'Loughlin 
1989: 291; Agnew and Corbridge 1989: 266). Furthermore, the 
language of international relations in the 1990s has become 
largely economic in character (Mack 1992: 17), with less emphasis 
on the political (Van der Usten 1992: 21; Agnew and Corbridge 
1989: 267); and certainty has been replaced by diversity 
(Johnston and Taylor 1989: 4). It is also unclear the present state 
of unipolarity (through the preponderance of the United States), 
can be maintained and prevent · an overwhelming balancing 
coalition against it (Layne 1993:5), as it is further unclear 
whether the present tendency towards regionalisation will re-
divide the globe into a number of corporate-driven blocs (Daly 
1993:28 ). The latter possibility may again see super-power 
rivalry between 'great powers' develop into global hegemony. 
Opinion on the subject seems to suggest that there is little 
possibility of a new liberal non-confrontational international 
order while there is a perceived need for hegemonic power 
associated with leadership and stability (Agnew and Corbridge 
1989: 273 ). According to Layne, the United States is ·attempting 
to maintain its own preponderance in a state of unipolarity 'to 
preserve the Cold War status quo even though _the Cold War is 
over' (Layne 1993:7). He maintains that the 'unipolar mowent' is 
an interregnum that must give way to multipolarity between 
2000-2010 A.D. (Layne 1993:7). This is because, in international 
politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to 
balance against it (Waltz 1991, cited in Layne 1993:7). 
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The reality of the global situation is such that the great powers 
are territorial states in a world of trading states and whatever 
new geopolitical order does emerge will have to recognise this fact 
(Agnew and Corbridge 1989:273 ). It is also argued that the 
position of world hegemon is now held only temporarily by the 
United States, which is lacking in some of the necessary 
qualifications for that role. Hegemony is usually measured with 
economic indicators such as GNP, percentage of world trade, 
industrial strength and military expenditure (O'Loughlin 1989: 
271). In the area of economic capability, the United States has 
faltered, its foreign debt now approaching three trillion dollars 
(George 1988: 25). In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration 
attempted to regain pre-eminence by strengthening the military 
basis of hegemony an act which unwittingly hastened hegemonic 
decline by placing the country under heavy debt (Burstein 1988: 
118). There was a serious mis-match between its political and 
economic pretentions. The real basis of American power had had 
more to do with the way the United States monopolised the 
western world's military and economic muscle after World War II, 
by creating a nexus of international relationships to reinforce that 
situation (Burstein 1989:274). But 'these have been much eroded, 
as was America's immense economic strength after the 1960s. 
Though there are signs that the United States has already begun 
to exhibit weakness in its altered status, its military strength has 
allowed it to corner the West's security market, and others lack 
the political will to challenge it in this (Chomsky 1991:5). This has 
resulted in an increased tendency to compensate for loss of 
prestige by a militarily aggressive foreign policy (as already noted 
in the key instance of the Persian Gulf: see Chapter Three). 
Though hardly conducive to global security, this policy 9-as proved 
to be economically viable. The Gulf War is said to have returned a 
profit for the Americans (Saikal 1991: 49). With huge debts and 
no economic relief in sight, it can hardly afford to pass up such 
opportunities. Thus, unable to afford true hegemony, the ,United 
States has been forced to accept the lesser status of pragmatic 
opportunist. 
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4.2 Challengers To American Power 
After a remarkable post-war recovery, Japan has fought a trade 
war with America and won. It has managed to avoid a worldwide 
recession for almost two decades while the western economies 
have floundered. This in itself is a remarkable feat marred only 
by a present period of restructuring-induced recession. There is a 
very good chance that, early in the next decade, Japan's GNP will 
equal and even surpass America's (Bergsten 1992:6). Japan is 
also known to be importing large quantities of plutonium which 
will increase its ability to become a nuclear power. Such a 
scenario does not augur well for a peaceful future, particularly if 
Burstein's analysis is correct: 
Historically, as the scales of economic balance tip and new 
global leaders emerge, there has been one constant. No new 
empue has replaced another without the attendant 
circumstances of international chaos, economic crises and 
war (Burstein 1988: 268). 
If economic power is the definitive measure of pre-emmence 
(since a weak economy cannot ihdefinitely maintain a strong 
military force) then Japan is well-placed for the challenge. It is 
well on the way to being a military power in the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. In a hostile and unstable region, re-
militarisation is not only possible but very probable (Burstein 
1988: 284 ). As Layne has noted, the more active Japan becomes 
on the international stage, the more military power will be 
needed to support its policies and ensure it is not at a bargaining 
disadvantage in its dealings with other nations. For this reason, it 
has plans to build a full-spectrum navy including air-craft 
carriers capable of operating independently of the . American 
Seventh Fleet (Layne 1993:38-39). Foreign Minister Watanabe 
publically called for Japan to acquire long-range air and· naval 
power capabilities in January 1993 (Layne 1993:39). 'l'hnc thP ..l.IIU~ '-.I..I.V 
evidence suggests that Japan is beginning to seek strategic 
autonomy, and an important step in this is the development of the 
capacity to gather and analyse politico/military and economic 
intelligence independently of the United States. Also, there is 
little doubt that Japan is becoming more assertive diplomatically 
as it speaks of a multipolar world in which the United States can 
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no longer play the kind of dominant role it used to play (Jameson 
1992, cited in Layne 1993:39). 
4.3 The International Economy since the Eighties 
The world economy in the 1980s has consisted of a 
remarkable juggling act in which the three chief sets of 
actors on the world economic stage, multinational 
corporations, banks and the governments of countries, have 
all striven to gain maximum advantage whilst simulateously 
promoting economic recovery (Thrift 1989: 16). 
The juggling act to which Thrift refers has not been a particularly 
successful one and it may be argued that much of its lack of 
success can be attributed to the profit accumulation function of 
the capitalist system. In the 1980s, under the banner of austerity 
and economic rationalism, inflation was forced under control. But 
high interest rates and a lack of international economic co-
ordination by governments retarded economic recovery (Thrift 
1989: 18), and future recovery is by no means certain given the 
enormous and complex changes in geo-economic systems. Such 
pessimistic possibilities were being inooted as early as 1976: 
It is no longer unthinkable to speculate whether industrial 
societies are approaching some sort of evolutionary cul-de-
sac. Instead of moving onwards to Daniel Bell's salubrious 
vision of the post-industrial state, we may have to face the 
possibility that the end-game of industrialism might well be 
that of the "entropy state" (Henderson 1976: 137). 
In a post-industrial world, the present trend to austerity may 
become the only realistic option (Johnson 1978). This is because a 
growth-based recovery in the world economy is unlikely to 
promote a viable future. If economic growth continues, its impact 
on an already stressed environment will increase and exacerbate 
the problems, no matter how ostensibly sustainable the growth. 
From World War II to 1973, the United States carried the 'burden' 
of the open international economy, just as Britain, the former 
hegemon, had done before her. Both had been major exporters of 
capital and, as the main creditor nations, both had a distinct 
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interest in monetary stability and paid for the security costs of 
their systems with a decline in their manufacturing base. It was a 
case of one capitalist economic system replacing another. The 
lifetime of a prevailing system of international economic relations 
in this century has been no more than 30-40 years (according to 
Hirst and Thompson 1992:360). The Bretton Woods system, 
which reached its peak m the 1960s, based on massive 
productivity, mechanisation, high-demand and the linking of 
wages to productivity, has clearly passed. It had been an 
exclusive club for rich countries where investment tended to be in 
the developed, stable societies, and where only a limited trade 
with the Third World existed (Thrift 1989: 18). Hirst and 
Thompson (1992:360) argue that it is dangerous to assume 
current major changes m the international economy are 
unprecedented, inevitable or irreversible. The Pax Britannica 
Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods systems were merely some 
of the structures of the international economy in this century. 
4.4 Present Economic Trends 
If 'a global economy' implies a "sy'stem where national economies 
are subsumed and rearticulated by autonomous international 
processes and transactions" (Hirst and Thompson 1992:360), then 
there is little evidence for its existence today. Instead, the world 
remains ordered in two economic groups, the developed industrial 
rich and the non-industrial poor. The really important relations 
remain between the developed economies, members of the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 
1989, 80 per cent of world trade was conducted between these 
countries (Hirst and Thompson 1992:366). If this is what is 
meant by a 'global economy', then it is a rather narrow. definition. 
Secondly, according to Tomlinson (1988, cited in Hirst and 
Thompson 1992:366), there is nothing particularly unique· about 
today's open worid economy. 1 ne international financial 
penetration of the UK and other economies in terms of capital 
flows was greater between 1905 and 1914 than it was between 
1982 and 1986. The huge increase in current capital flows is 
largely due to the floating of exchange rates. The integration of 
trading on currency and equity markets is the only new feature of 
the present period (Hirst and Thompson 1992:367). 
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4.5 New Capitalism 
As already noted, the early 1970s were highly traumatic for the 
industrial economies. The US the model and rallying point of the 
capitalist economies, was under siege politically, economically and 
culturally. The western economic system was becoming 
inordinately unstable. What followed has been called an 
extensive accumulation regime: 
The re-organisation of firms so that they could meet the 
heightened conditions of lower economic growth and the re-
organisation of mechanisms of regulation by the state or 
state-related institutions (Thrift 1989: 19). 
The multiplicity of labels for the new capitalist regime, such as 
'neo-Fordism', 'flexible accumulation' and 'disorganised capital' 
suggests a degree of imprecision regarding the exact nature of the 
new order. Yet one fact is clear: the 1970s and 1980s have been a 
time of frenzied experimentation by multinational corporations, at 
the heart of which has been the process of the internationalisation 
of capital (Thrift 1989: 19). Essentially this is the exporting of 
capitalist relations of production via the activities of the multi-
national companies. Also in the 1970s, there had been a massive 
drive to invest capital in the Third World where it was thought 
profits could still be made. It was the beginning of the debt crisis, 
dealt with more expansively in the Chapter Five. 
Following the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the 1980s witnessed 
a decline in the rate of foreign investment in the Third World, a 
drop in living standards directly associated with the structural 
adjustment policies of major lenders and a crash in commodity 
prices. In development terms, the 1980s were a lost decade for 
the of Third World countries -~ an~ a period of 
retrenchment in the world economy (Thrift 1989:26). From such 
i 
contraction we are now, m the 1990s, witnessing the 
establishment of a tripolar world economic structure in which the 
bulk of the global trade in goods, services and investment 
increasingly occurs between North America, Europe and the Asia-
Pacific basin. Once again, as in the post-war prosperity of the 
CHAPTER4 P29 
1960s, Latin America and Africa, where the need for development 
is greatest, are virtually ignored. In addition, the same countries 
are compelled to maintain a flow of capital to service sovereign 
debts. Consequently, most of the rise in the world's exports in the 
1980s has been absorbed by the above triangle of wealth, whilst 
the economic interaction between these three world regions has 
been increasing over time and now constitutes a tightly-knit 
system (Thrift 1989: 26) According to Bello (1989: 14 ), the 
developing countries are again in a highly-disadvantaged position. 
The threat by transnational companies to leave an area if wages 
rise brings all kinds of governments into line. Much of the Third 
World has very few options: 
Commodity prices are no longer expected to soar, the metals 
markets are fragmented and Third World countries now have 
fewer financincing options. As a result, they are granting 
concessions that would have been unthinkable even five 
years earlier (Khor Kok Peng 1992:28). 
The 1990s began triumphantly for the western capitalist system 
with the collapse of the Soviet economic order. But the 1990s 
have also been years in which : the economies of industrial 
countries have continued to languish after two decades of 
continuous economic internationalisation, volatile markets and 
recession. Neither traditional Keynesian remedies nor the 
monetarist strategies of the late 1970s have met with a great deal 
of success. 
4.6 Market Capitalism 
Market capitalism is an economic system which must produce 
vast quantities of non-necessities in order to remain healthy, and 
what is produced is always determined by what will yield the 
highest return on investment. Market forces alLocate the world's 
increasingly scarce resources for the wasteful consumption of the 
relatively rich. Colombia's soil and labour is being exhausted 
through the production of vegetables, coffee and flowei·s for 
export to the USA instead of staple foods for local children 
(Trainer 1985: 13 ). It is argued that the policies of inappropriate 
development by the rich industrialised countries have facilitated 
the impoverishment of much of the post-colonial Third World, and 
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such short-sightedness (by reducing Third World demand for 
Western goods) since the recession years of the early 1970s has 
been a contributing factor in the economic mismanagement and 
confusion of the present times (George 1992:97). 
Seabrook (1992: 15) argues that the world is in the grip of a 
particularly virulent form of economic fundamentalism which 1s 
all the more dangerous because of its inability to recognise or 
name itself. It is characterised by a religious inflexibility and its 
adherents are so blinded by crusading fervour that they 
disconfirm reality. This is precisely why: 
Almost every country that has fallen under the tutelage of 
the western financial institutions, its GATT negotiators, its 
transnational corporations, its experts, specialists and creators 
of wealth, has been subjected to identical programmes, 
independently of the conditions prevailing m the country 
under consideration (Seabrook 1992:15). 
Yet the V/ est does not feel any obligation to apply the same 
precepts to itself where this becomes inconvenient. The 
imposition of free trade, cuts in subsidies to the poor and the 
liberalisation of agriculture are all policies for export only. As 
Seabrook rightly notes, it is an ideology of dominance (1992: 16). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE THIRD WORLD DEBT/DEVELOPMENT CRISIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter ts threefold. It traces the means by which 
the Third World debt crisis developed, the political nature of this 
debt, and the structural means by which it is perpetuated in the 
development policies of the aid and lending institutions. 
The most recent world economic depression, which began m the 
early 1970s and continued into the 1990s, has generated a world-
wide leap in stockprices and fragility within banking systems. It 
has seen a series of global economic crises and an era of severe 
instability where effective correction appears beyond the capacity 
of national and corporate leaders. High interest rates in the 1980s 
greatly increased the interest repayments on established Third 
World loans. At the same time, structural adjustment policies and 
austerity measures imposed on borrower nations reduced demand 
for western products. This contributed to unemployment in the 
industrialised countries (George 1992: 96) and had a broadly 
negative effect on the world economy (Freeman 1989:61). The 
policy of banking institutions at this time was to shift 
unrepayable debts onto the backs of western taxpayers by 
recycling private debts to public lending bodies. This was done at 
no cost to original private lenders (George 1992:68) and helped to 
deepen the global recession by reducing demand and increasing 
unemployment within developed countries. For some, the 
solution was obvious - a reversal of diminished purchas\ng power: 
The only way to stop the coming depression is to impose 
wealth taxes free from loopholes, on the richest one per cent 
of all nations and to use the revenue either to eliminate 
government deficits or to reduce taxes on the poor and the 
middle classes (Batra 1988:7). 
In the 1990s western European economies remain m a state of 
cns1s. Not since the Depression of the 1930s has there been such 
a lack of confidence m political and economic systems. As we 
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have seen, the burst of prosperity from World War II to the early 
1970s has almost faded into history as the now market-driven 
world completes its second decade of recession. In this 
atmosphere, austerity for the poor is the prescribed way of life, 
along with restructuring and structural adjustment for an 
indebted Third World, all symptoms of insecurity and crisis as the 
world waits for the good times to return. 
5.2 Neo-Colonialism 
It has already been noted (Chapter One) that World War II 
marked the decisive termination of a world order characterised 
by imperial colonial regimes dominated by the British, and the 
establishment of another under the hegemony of the United 
States. In the post-war years many ex-colonies began to see the 
growth and popularity of independence movements. More 
importantly, the United States did not look favourably on the old 
colonial style of governing subjects, mainly because of the 
constraints this placed on its own business expansion. Eisenhower 
had taken it as an article of faith that America's strength and 
security depended on its maintaining access to, and indeed control 
of, global markets and resources, particularly in the Third World. 
Chomsky (1992:45) goes further, attributing to the United States 
the development and implementation of the concept of a Grand 
Area (the Western hemisphere, the Far East and the former 
British colonies), a region deemed strategically necessary for 
world control, where corporate and state managers hoped to 
design a blueprint for hegemony. The strategic dimensions of the 
Marshall Plan required that revolutionary nationalism be 
thwarted outside Europe just as the fight against indigenous 
commumsm was to be promoted within. Third World countries in 
this Grand Plan would serve the needs of industrial countries. 
This meant that a major poiicy imperative was the blocking of all 
nationalist forces attempting to use their own resources in conflict 
with the interests of the United States. As noted previously, the 
most important source of oil, the Middle East (Odell 1992:294 ), 
has been the area of max1mum focus and hence ready 
intervention by the United States. 
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5.3 'Development' Models 
In a western-ordered world, the promise of post-war freedom 
could not be realised by the "useful" undeveloped countries, 
because the Third World was offered unachievable development 
models. According to Chomsky (1992: 144 ), it has long been 
tacitly accepted that the same capitalist development models have 
had limited application and that successful industrial societies 
themselves depart significantly from them, which is the main 
reason why they are successful. In the United States, the sectors 
of the economy that remain competitive are those that are 
supported by the public purse, such as high-tech industries, 
capital-intensive agriculture and pharmaceuticals (Chomsky 
1992:144 ). The development model used in the newly 
industrialised countries (NICS) (so often held up as glowing 
examples of successful development in the late twentieth century 
by the World Bank and the IMF), is seriously misrepresented 
according to Bello and Rosenfeld (1992). The laws of the free 
market operate only within constraints imposed by state elites. 
This state-directed development or "command capitalism" ensures 
export-oriented production, underwritten by cheap labour and an 
under-valued currency (Bello and Rosenfeld 1992:2). In effect, 
"free enterprise" provides a useful weapon against government 
policies aimed at benefiting the general public and is therefore 
perfect for application in the former colonies and the old Soviet 
empue. The rich and powerful have understood that. Since the 
history of capitalism is punctuated with crises, it would be foolish 
indeed to rely on the vagaries of the open market alone. In spite 
of the rousing free-market rhetoric, industrial elites appreciate 
the need to protect themselves with public subsidies, and the 
security of protectionism and regulation. Yet for the ,struggling-
to-develop countries, the unregulated market model is preferred, 
recommended, and in many cases imposed. According to 
Corbridge (1992), this is part of the agenda of a 'New Right' 
counter-revolution in development economics: 
The counter-revolution proclaims its faith in the market and 
in outward-looking development strategies regardless of 
time and space. Markets exist in the Third World along with 
a market mentality: the job of governments is to let the 
market mechanism flourish (Corbridge 1992:288). 
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5.4 The Debt Thickens 
In the prosperous years of the 1960s, western industrial countries 
did not share their remarkable growth and prosperity with the 
Third World. Developing countries had been largely excluded 
from the economic activity of those years. For all intents and 
purposes, mass consumption, the "powerhouse of demand" as it 
has often been called, excluded countries other than those of the 
industrialised core. Capitalism had temporarily resolved the 
question of markets on an internal basis (Thrift 1989: 19). What 
was exported to the Third World merely recovered the cost of 
imported raw materials and multi-nationals generally preferred 
the stability of developed countries. This meant that many Third 
World nations were strapped for cash and could only buy 
industrial commodities on credit, willingly supplied by export-
credit agencies in rich countries. These financed, insured and 
otherwise guaranteed payment to their own exporters, from the 
public purse. 
In 1969, the Pearson Commission r~ported to the World Bank two 
trends which became increasingly characteristic of Third World 
debts. Firstly, it noticed that private banks were becoming less 
concerned about the borrowing countries' credit-worthiness, that 
export credits were an expensive form of external finance, and 
that exporters often marked up the price of their products by as 
much as 100 per cent (Adams 1991:84). Secondly, the Commisson 
cast grave doubts on the value of feasibility studies by suppliers 
favoured by reckless borrowing countries for their short-sighted 
schemes. But the dire warnings of balance-of-payment problems 
in developing countries passed unheeded and export credit 
programmes increased throughout the next decade. 
After 1967 it became apparent that US monetary policy was too 
expansionary to maintain stable prices either in the United States 
itself or in the world market (Ray 1989: 106), which ultimately 
brought an end to the fixed exchange rate system created by the 
Bretton Woods agreement. In 1971 President Nixon announced 
that the US would no longer maintain an official price of gold in 
terms of American dollars. Two years later, The current flexible 
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exchange rate was recognised as the established international 
regime. Inflation, which was accelerating in the developed 
countries, was associated with the rapid rise of US dollar balances 
abroad and the OPEC oil prices after 1974 and 1979 (Ray 
1989:107). This generated much of the liquidity which became 
loans to developing countries. According to Alvater and Hubner, 
it was at this time that developing countries thought conditions 
most favourable to shake off the old dependence and speed up 
the processes of industrialisation and modernisation: 
Investment-fatigued concerns from the capitalist metropole 
and Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
with their new found-wealth had flooded the international 
money and credit markets with liquid funds (Metro-dollars 
and Petro-dollars). During the 1970s total borrowing on the 
Eurodollar markets swelled by average rates of 25% per 
annum (Altvater and Hubner 1991 :8). 
It was also · at this time that the western banks began to organise 
their businesses on an increasingly transnational basis and since 
the late 1960s they have become major sources of finance to the 
Third World. Because lending rates were so favourable (and at 
times even negative due to inflation rate fluctuations), the 
external debts of the Third World rocketed in the 1970s. In the 
period 1973-1982 the debt rose from $100 billion to $800 billion, 
a growth of more than 20 per cent per annum (Altvater and 
Hubner 1991:9). 
For the Mexican government, mounting debts in 1982 produced a 
repayment problem which frightened the commercial banks 
away. Export agencies then became a more important source of 
finance for Third World importers and western exporters. Today, 
according to estimates by the National Foreign Trade Council, one 
third of the thirty billion dollars a year in capital goods ·traded 
world-wide is financed through tied aid and export financing 
packages (Adams 1991:85). 
5.5 Debt Rescheduling 
The prescient Pearson Commission also noted a growing need for 
rescheduling debts owed by poor countries. Rescheduling could 
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be used as a shield to hide losses which a government may have 
suffered or was likely to suffer on its sovereign loans, a case of 
paperwork disguising reality (Adams 1991 :90). It is important to 
note that without the seal of approval from the IMF (and the Paris 
Club) private loans can only be rescheduled with difficulty since, 
without that approval, the private banks refuse to provide fresh 
money to a country which has got into arrears. At the same time, 
since each case is treated on its merit, the international debt crisis 
is broken down into the debt crisis of individual countries. This 
deters the likelihood of global approaches (that a1m at 
rectification of the system as a whole) from becoming viable 
alternative strategies: 
The idea that it is, in principle, possible for any debtor 
nation to be one of those treated preferentially in this game 
has for a long time contributed considerably to the failure of 
debtors' cartels and collective action to develop. For the 
creditors, divide and rule is the key to successful cnsts 
management (Altvater and Hubner 1991: 12). 
According to the World Bank, the case-by-case approach has been 
one of the fundamental points of the debt strategy to date, 
especially for countries with good prospects of entering the 
market. The incentives and rewards for them must be 
maintained and strengthened (Qureshi 1989:4 7). 
Rescheduling is no real solution to the debt problems of borrower 
countries. It merely defers the problem to some future date 
because debtors are still required to transfer their resources and 
their wealth to the creditor institutions in rich countries. The 
repayments periods of Mexico and Brazil already stretch well into 
the next century. 
Until the early 1960s, it had been customary for borrowers to 
approach banks for loans, but by the end of the decade, as lending 
became more competitive and lucrative, bank officers began to 
solicit business on their own initiative. By 1970 they were 
lending to Third World countries such as Mexico and Brazil, 
whereas formerly they had restricted loans to safe industrialised 
countries. Such generosity with other> people's money was even 
extended to 'uncertain' countries like Argentina, Peru, Korea, and 
CHAPTER 5 P37 
the Philippines (Sampson 1982: 116). At the same time, the 
relation between the borrowing governments and the bankers 
remained rather vague, the latter assuming a safety net existed in 
the likelihood of a default by the borrowing countries: 
... major private banks believed that they had explicit or 
implicit understandings with their own governments that in 
a worst case scenario they would not be stuck holding 
worthless debt. In other words, in the event that loans to 
developing countries did not get repaid, lending country 
governments would come to the aid of troubled financial 
institutions (Ray 1989:110). 
The problem of a major nation defaulting on its repayments 
seemed remote, until August 1982 when Mexico, the Third 
World's most heavily indebted nation, declared her inability to 
make repayments. 
5.6 The Crisis 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the formation of OPEC had been 
largely a response to the neo-colonial attitude of the American 
companies. At the time of the first oil price rise in 1973, the 
Nixon Administration, while grappling with its own social and 
economic problems, was in no mood for flexibility. It opposed any 
move which appeared to accept the OPEC price rise and 
discouraged plans to 'recycle' or lend the surplus funds to needy 
countries through the IMF or World Bank (Sampson 1982:121). 
OPEC's new prices were not oniy a convenient argument to justify 
higher costs in consuming countries and profits for the oil 
companies but the United States economy also stood to gain from 
OPEC increases. Higher oil prices in the rest of the world would 
make America more competitive by raising the energy costs of 
imported OPEC oil in Europe and Japan (Odell 1986:224). The new 
OPEC oil costs could be offset by increased eai·nings by the oil 
companies which were remitted back to the United States as 
I 
profits. This was compelling logic, flawed . only in that higher 
prices bled the consuming public whilst company profits were not 
necessarily redistributed back to the public or even reached the 
public purse. 
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In the non-oil-producing countries of the Third World, the effects 
of oil rises were severe. Many were crippled by the Second Oil 
Hike in 1979 since alternative fuel options were not available. 
Consequently, unstable developing economies were made even 
more precarious (Odell 1986:161). The same economies were 
highly disadvantaged by the international oil companies which 
controlled the import price of fuel and influenced the availability 
of loans from international institutions. The oil supplied to India, 
for example, came from the nearby Middle East, but cost this 
struggling nation the same high price as fuel produced in the 
United States (Odell 1986:171). When neighbouring impoverished 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) accepted Soviet help to build its own refinery 
capacity in 1964-65, America intervened on behalf of the oil 
compames by cutting off assistance to that country (Odell 
1986:176). 
By 1979-1981, many developing countries were in very serious 
trouble. New loans were often their only option. Their collective 
debt had grown to three hundred billion dollars by 1982 when 
the price of crude oil rose to an unprecedented thirty dollars per 
barrel. By 1985 this debt was one thousand billion (Odell 
1986: 187). In many cases, the cost of debt-servicing meant 
payments of over half of the country's total foreign exchange and 
economic crisis. 
OPEC policies during this period contributed to the debt problems 
of non-oil producers. Poor countries discovered that after the 
initial elation of seeing the masters of the world order severely 
discomfited, they could expect little more from the newly-
enriched producers. OPEC members made little attempt at 
managing their vast wealth and developing a differential oil-
pricing policy for the poorer consumers. Having helped to 
increase Third World indebtedness, OPEC countries also missed a 
great opportunity to change the unbalanced relationship between 
countries of the North and South: 
Had OPEC managed its own recycling and loaned directly to 
the Third World without g1vmg this unprecedented 
opportunity and extremely powerful tool to the banks, much 
of the suffering might have been avoided. But also had 
OPEC countries been both suppliers of energy and purveyors 
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of finance to much of the rest of the world, they could have 
strengthened immeasurably the collective hand of the South 
and their own political influence (George 1988:45). 
Instead, OPEC presented rich western countries, governments, 
banks and the IMF with an unprecedented opportunity to weaken 
the South (including OPEC countries themselves), left it far worse 
off than before the borrowing binge, and laid it open to virtual 
recolonisation through perpetual indebtedness. 
In 1972, surpluses on the foreign trade accounts of oil producers 
were a combined $5000 million. In 1974 they jumped to $30,000 
million and thereafter increased rapidly (Odell 1986:234 ). If, 
indeed, the collapse of the western monetary system was the aim 
of OPEC producers, then all that was needed was to choose the 
strategy. Yet it is arguable whether OPEC countries really did 
have a money weapon after 1973. According to senior vice-
president of Citibank, Irving Friedman, the vast volumes of petro-
dollars which were re-invested in western banks were simply 
absorbed into a much bigger flow of world savings and lending 
which included the huge flow of ell:rodollars. For Friedman, there 
was no such thing as oil money. The demand for funds was not 
met or made possible by the oil surplus but by funds made 
available from the entire savings-credit mechanism of the 
western world (cited m Sampson 1982: 126). This v1ew 
underestimates the power of OPEC producers, whose bargaining 
power until 1980 (when the largest producer, Saudi Arabia, broke 
ranks to flood the market with oil), had been formidable. The 
defection of the Saudis took the wind out of OPEC's sails as 
defeated members returned to being good capitalists, handing 
over their money to the professionals in London and New York. 
5.7 AU The Way To The Banks 
In the 1970s the big American and British banks had keenly 
sought OPEC's petrodollars. No-one was turned away. The 
investment flood that followed, quickly became an unprecedented 
lending spree to countries in the Third World. According to 
Sampson, it was a case of avarice overwhelming sound judgement 
and business principles. Bankers were unable to refuse the 
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billions of deposits, even at the risk of making what they knew 
were dangerous loans (Sampson 1982: 128). The laws of supply 
and demand prevailed. Third World countries needed loans to 
pay for the expensive imports in the inflationary years after 
1972. Bankers were the middle men; money recyclers and 
reapers of outrageous profits in the process: 
They [the banks] could earn higher profits because as a 
general rule, the poorer the country, the higher the interest 
and the charges. In four years, between 1972 and 1976, the 
big banks rapidly increased profits from abroad. The oil 
crisis was close to a disaster for the world, but a bonanza for 
the banks (Sampson 1982:141 ). 
By 1974 the banks not only overshadowed official lending bodies 
such as the World Bank and the IMF but they also altered the 
pattern of that lending. Commercial banks were making loans to 
sovereign states instead of corporations in the private sector so 
that by 1974, 62 per cent of loans went to governments and 
government organisations (Sampson 1982:141 ). Loans were no 
longer earmarked for specific projects so they could be used to 
finance day-to-day consumption and balance of payments, a 
bottomless pit in many cases. More importantly, this kind of 
lending opened the gates to opportunism, graft and corruption 
among government officials and elites. Sovereign loans were 
risky because governments could not be easily compelled to repay 
interest on loans: they merely risked tarnishing their credit rating 
(although the stigma attached to this was something very few 
countries were prepared to risk). Western governments and 
banks feared that a single default would spark off more and a 
mass of withdrawals would in turn result in a world-wide 
financial crisis. Consequently, the more the bank~ lent to 
developing countries, the more reluctant they became to allow a 
default. It was preferable to lend more in order to avert a crisis. 
A US Senate study of 1977 concluded that: 
The viability of the whole international system is premised 
on the assumption that all the players stay in the game: that 
the banks continue lending and borrowers keep paying the 
interest so that the principal may be refinanced or "rolled 
over"; for individual borrowers, the money continues to 
circulate. The biggest threat to the system lies in the 
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possibility that one of the passengers on this merry- go-
round will decide to get off - that one of the large debtors 
calls in the chits (Sampson 1982: 155) 
It was also doubtful whether the banks even wanted to escape as 
long as they could make a profit. It was equally uncertain 
whether a country could really become bankrupt. After all, it was 
its own collateral. Consequently, from the mid-1970s, many Third 
World nations and their lender western banks became locked 
together in a very precarious relationship. 
In 1969 the Pearson Commission's warning of a Third World debt 
crisis had passed without much attention. The concern was 
mainly over the loose purse strings of government agencies. The 
commercial banks' share of development loans was only around 
15 per cent in the early 1970s. By 1980 it had risen to two-thirds 
of the loans in this area (Adams 1991:96). Yet many debtors 
were unlikely to ever be able to repay the original loans. Zaire, 
for example, one of Africa's richest and most corrupt nations, 
could not make interest payments in 1975 (George 1988: 117). 
For Congdon (1989) the 1980s phenomenon of global financial 
irresponsibility culminating in debt crises was all connected to the 
inordinate rise in real interest rates. By the early 1980s, 55-60 
per cent of all developing country debt was owed to the 
commercial banks when suddenly, in the wake of global recession, 
the careless nature of these banks' lending policies became 
evident. 
their 
Third World borrowers woke to the reality that most of 
debts were short-term and at 'variable' (market-
determined) rates. As the rates increased, they automatically 
added billions to the debt-service bill. At the same time, 
borrowers found that interest payments were absorbing a larger 
part of their export earnings at a time when commodity .. prices 
It quickly became a debt-development 
cns1s: 
In the new environment with interest rates above the growth 
rate of exports, the debt export ratio was kept stable only if 
the debtor countries achieved trade surpluses; and trade 
surpluses mean net transfers of resources to their creditors in 
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the industrial world which then drain them of resources for 
their development (Congdon 1989:25). 
5.8 Debt And Development: The New Slavery 
In the western world order, there are mechanisms for 
maintaining Third World dependency, and heavy indebtedness 
has been a most effective method: 
Third World countries are being effectively tied into 
Western models of development, with Western countries 
guaranteed a permanent technological lead. The old 
economic order is doing industrial countries very nicely 
economically and politically. Third World resources are as 
cheaply available as in the colonial days without the costs of 
foreign administrations (Ekins 1992:29). 
'Development' from backward primitive self-sufficiency to 
industrialisation and prosperity was the carrot dangled before the 
Third World. Modern science and technology would lift the 
peripheral nations out of their chronic poverty. This model was 
so appealing that every young post-colonial nation seemed 
determined to apply it. The termfnology, though, was somewhat 
sensitive, as Sampson notes: 
The countries which were first described as "backward" or 
simply poor were later called underdeveloped or LDCs or 
"developing" as opposed to the richer or developed nations 
(Sampson 1982:93 ). 
The language of development was there to serve dominant 
interests. It implied that the world was driven by the 
imperatives of a natural law governing the advance of societies. 
But according to Hein and Mutter, since the 1970s and· 1980s the 
paradigms of development theory and policy have ended up as a 
theory of modernisation. And although modernisation strategy 
has proved useful as a way of propagating Fordist structures m 
Third World countries, these structures have done more to 
prevent than to facilitate the intended wholesale modernisation of 
society (Hein and Mutter 1991 :96). It is therefore questionable 
whether the western development process was really achievable 
for most, given the vast differences between developed and 
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developing countries. After all, the West had developed in an 
"emptier" world of greater opportunity, including the rather 
important ability to exploit a colonised Third World (Rollason 
1981 ). Alternatively, it has been argued that Europe was first 
able to achieve an industrial revolution (and dominance) because 
natural disasters were fewer and less deadly than in Asia. The 
tropical warm lands were not only more prone to natural 
dislocation from climatic extremes, but were also less capable of 
coping with disasters when they occurred. In the homelands of 
western civilisation, nature was kinder (Blainey 1988:207). 
It is also important to note that industrialisation was (and is) 
often disastrous for rural countries which depended on 
agriculture. A case in point is India which proved almost 
resistant to funding programmes by western governments and 
the World Bank. It had been assumed that this country wanted to 
become part of the western economic system without questioning 
whether the world was able to accommodate its products. An 
industrialised India on the scale of Japan would certainly produce 
some interesting global economic and environmental effects. It is 
also doubtful whether this vast rural population could become 
rapidly industrialised without destroying its fundamental social, 
cultural and economic patterns, (see p. 55), or that it was even 
possible for a democratic nation to be able to impose the 
necessary discipline for such a transition. 
5.9 Problems With The NICs 
According to Bello and Rosenfeld (1992) the inherent problems of 
a western-preferred model have been amply demonstrated in the 
effects of late twentieth century development in the newly 
industrialised countries of the Third World (NICS). In Taiwan, 
high speed growth without environmental controls has converted 
a country into a poisoned paradise of free-wheeling capitalism. 
Here crops are contaminated with pesticides and heavy metals 
from unregulated waste dumping. In Korea, the dimensions of the 
environmental crisis continue to come to light with world record 
levels of sulphur dioxide concentrations in Seoul's air, rain with 
high acid content, tap water with heavy metals at many times the 
official tolerance levels and nuclear reactors plagued by 
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malfunctions and accidents (Bello and Rosenfeld 1992: 12). In 
both cases, the state has so identified itself with capital that it has 
been necessary to resort to terrorism to maintain a productive 
labour force. "Command capitalism" has demanded a military 
discipline of its workforce along with poor conditions and low 
wages. This, then, is the price of competitiveness in the World 
Bank-IMP-preferred development model for the Third World. It 
1s the "technofascist option" of Andre Gorz in which: 
... the limits necessary to the preservation of life will be 
centrally determined and planned by ecological engineers, 
and the programmed production of an "optimal" environment 
will be entrusted to centralised institutions and hard 
technologies (Gorz 1987:17). 
5.10 A Mono-Cultural Development Model 
The West's vision of Third World development is based in large 
part on the goal of bringing all natural resources into the global 
market economy. Here it is claimed by influential economic 
advisors, such as the World Bank: and the IMF that developing 
countries must learn to sink or swim at the deep end of 
international competition. But producers lose the ability to decide 
what they shall produce and when to do it. Their products are for 
foreigners who pay a higher price than local consumers and use 
this leverage to control production. The poor, with their low 
purchasing power, have little say in this single organising 
structure. 
When products are pooled into a global market, the link between 
local producers and consumers is broken and the loss .of control 
over quality and appropriateness of products is inevitable. Such a 
system entails a considerable threat to cultural and natural 
diversity. Because the capitalist market system is the estabiished 
order in the 'western' world: 
Once 'development' became the principal objective of 
practically every country in the world, a global process of 
homogenisation in emulation of the world's most 'developed' 
country, the United States, was inevitable (Ekins 1992:34). 
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A homogenous world market (a product of the 'level playing field' 
mentality) abhors diversity as an obstacle to trade efficiency but 
ignores inequality and poverty. It aims to simplify and 
rationalise the production and marketing process and its dubious 
benefits are constantly championed by the World Bank which 
links its own 'expertise' in development with an all-encompassing 
market: 
No matter what the outlook in the industrial economies, the 
world's long-term prosperity and security - by sheer force of 
numbers - depend on development. Despite the uncertain 
outlook for the 1990s, a measure of optimism is justified now 
that more and more countries are opting for a market-
friendly approach (World Development Report 1991: 157) 
The ultimate result is a growing gap between the world poor and 
the world rich. Chapter Six looks more closely at the agenda 
behind the "harmonisation" aims of the recent GATT Round and 
their implications for Third World development. 
5.11 Accounting For Maldevelopment 
Development, or rather 'maldevelopment' from the point of v1ew 
of its recipients, continues to deliver affluence to world elites at 
the expense of the poor. Contradictions between conspicuous 
consumption and poverty are stark. In many poor countries such 
as Brazil, child labour is essential for the survival of unsupported 
families. . Education, basic health and social services are 
unaffordable luxuries. It is estimated that over one billion people 
may be suffering from serious poverty in the Third World today 
(World Bank Report 1991:11 ). The majority live without basic 
necessities. 
Maldevelopment 1s inextricably linked with the political/economic 
following ways. Through industry and finance capital~, they 
manage employment opportunities, income distribution and the 
maintainance of a comprador class 1n foreign countries. 
Transnational and agribusiness corporations exert undue 
influence over the politico/economic policies of their host 
countries and are unaccountable to them. Special trading 
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arrangements such as the Lome Convention, negotiated between 
the EC and the sixty or so African, Carribbean and Pacific 
countries, bind the economies of ex-colonies to the North through 
aid, trade and investment agreements. According to Ekins 
(1992:35), the resemblance between the classical model of trading 
relations (established on the basis of mutual gain from 
comparative advantage), and free market capitalism, is very small 
indeed. Differences in power between trading parties may result 
in all the gains going to the more powerful partners. Trade can 
thus lead to dependency relationships which effectively remove 
the freedom not to trade. Also, trading decisions can be greatly 
constrained by such external factors as indebtedness and the 
obligatory export of primary commodities by the batteries of 
Northern protective measures which limit the extent of Southern 
diversification into secondary activities. Trade, through 
dependency, can lead to vulnerability, insecurity and loss of 
autonomy (Ekins 1992:35), and was the area of much concern for 
the Third World in GATT negotiations 
5.12 Poverty And Development 
It is important to distinguish between two kinds of poverty m the 
Third World. Subsistence economies which satisfy basic needs 
through self-provisioning are not poor in the sense of being 
deprived. This culturally-perceived poverty, ('less than $370 per 
year'; World Development Report 1990:iii) need not be real 
material deprivation. According to Sachs (1993 :4 ), this kind of 
globalised perception of an individual cultural condition was 
nothing more than a statistical operation. A "GNP per capita" was 
a uni versalised construct to assert superiority. From the 
perspective of a western development model, such societies are 
backward and deprived because they do not participate ~n the 
consumption habits of a market economy, although they may 
satisfy their basic needs through self-provisioning mechanisms 
(Shiva 1990:1 0). This kind of "poverty" (often a prudent, 
sustainable subsistence where local needs have been traditionally 
met with locally available supplies) has provided the 
legitimisation of the development programmes of Northern 
commercial lenders, multi-lateral development banks and 
grasping governments, all of which have been eager for easy 
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profit from the 'undeveloped' world. In the process they have 
often replaced viable lifestyles with dependence and destitution: 
Along with community ties, it is land, forest and water which 
are the most important prerequisites for a subsistence 
economy without money. When these are taken away or 
destroyed, destitution occurs. Again and again, peasants, 
nomads and tribals have fallen prey to misery when driven 
from their land, savannah regions and forests (Sachs 1993:6). 
Ill-conceived and poorly-executed programmes funded by the 
world's lenders (see 5 .18) have often degraded soils and genetic 
wealth. For women specifically, the new impoverishment "lies in 
the fact that the same resources which supported their survival, 
were absorbed into the market economy while they themselves 
were excluded and displaced by it" (Shiva 1989: 13). 
For Ekins, this kind of development in the Third W odd during the 
last forty years, has been disappointing. The economic growth 
which was supposed to abolish absolute poverty, has failed to 
materialise. In many countries of :the Third World, especially in 
Latin America and Africa, the material conditions of large 
populations have in fact worsened. In Sub-Saharan Africa, they 
have reached crisis proportions: 
• per capita incomes have fallen by almost 25% during the 
1980s; 
• investments have fallen by almost 50% and are now m per 
capita terms lower than they were in the middle of the 1960s; 
• imports are today only 6% of per capita imports in 1970; 
• exports have fallen by 45% since 1980; 
• the external debt has grown from $10 billion in 1972 to a 
staggering $230 billion in 1987. The capacity to service it has 
not kept pace, thus creating an unmanagable situation for 
some twenty low-income countries; 
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• the share of children starting school is beginning to decline 
and in some places the infant mortality rate is on the increase 
(Ekins 1992:8-9). 
Combating poverty in developing countries is a simple matter 
from the point of view of developmentalist institutions. All that is 
required is more loans (debt), more structural adjustment and 
more free market rhetoric, such as the following attempt to justify 
World Bank policies: 
Experience [the Bank's] also shows that it is possible to shift 
public spending in favour of the poor, even within an overall 
framework of fiscal discipline, and to target transfers more 
accurately. In addition, increased capital inflows can be used 
to help cushion the impact of adjustment on the poor 
(World Development Report 1990:3 ). 
5.13 The Northern Flow Of Resources 
As already noted, when world interest rates were forced up by 
the United States in the 1980s, many of the Third World debtors 
were quickly exhausted and forced into the hands of the World 
Bank and IMF, which gradually took over many of the liabilities, 
risks and losses of the private lenders. Since 1982 the private 
banks have been most successful in extricating themselves from 
the Third World nations' debt crisis in order to strengthen their 
negotiating position with the borrowers. This is of course only 
possible at the expense of the debtor countries (Altvater and 
Hubner 1991:1 0). Consequently, there has been a flow of public 
wealth Northwards. According to Vandana Shiva: 
Debt, the debacle in commodity prices, and spe~ulation in 
the commodities futures markets have become a major 
source of 'economic growth'. In the South, since 1981 Third 
World countries have become net capital exporters: soaring 
from $7 billion in 1981 to $74 billion in 1985. This excludes 
the TNCs' profit repatriation and capital flights. If all these 
were added up, the flow of capital from South to North is 
about $250 billion (Shiva 1990:222). 
This high level of impoverishment will not be 
in the long term as it must ultimately end m 
crises and social unrest. Rosa Luxemburg 
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colonialism was a constant, necessary condition for capitalist 
growth and without colonies, capital accumulation and the 
commercialisation of the economy would grind to a halt. The 
formal process of decolonisation in the second half of this century 
has not seen the withering away of dependency relations but a 
prolific growth in same. Development-driven debt has proved to 
be a more efficient form of exploitation than colonisation. 
5.14 International Agents Of 'Development': The World 
Bank, the IMF and other Lending Institutions 
The Third World is not poor because of some inherent 
disability in the people who live there nor because it became 
'frozen' at some point in history and so 'failed to develop'. 
The so-called "underdevelopment" of the Third World is a 
human creation. It is the product of the social, the political 
and especially the economic policies of the western nations 
since the internationalisation of trade at the end of the 
Fifteenth Century (Rollason 1981:3). 
The World Bank, the IMP, and the various UN aid agencies have 
consistently adopted policies that favour an elitist global economic 
order, to the disadvantage of western taxpayers, the Third World 
poor and the natural environment. According to Adams, the 
source of the problem lay in the foundation of the Bank and the 
IMP in the ideas of John Maynard Keynes (who had little regard 
for popular democracy). He held views close to Plato's, namely 
that societies are best governed by a guardian class, unswayed by 
the passions of humanity (Adams 1991 :67). He was therefore 
determined to ensure that both the Bank and the IMF would be 
beyond the political influence of the strongest nations. However, 
given the power and influence of the United States in 1945, and 
subsequently, such highmindedness was set aside as America took 
control of western economies and set about consolidating its 
hegemony. The negotiations at Bretton Woods made it patently 
clear that the US, the richest and largest creditor of the Bank, 
would play a decisive part in shaping its policies. A tradition was 
quickly set to ensure the Bank's president would always be a 
citizen of the United States, and at the insistence of the US (and 
against the wishes of Keynes), both the Bank and the IMF would 
continue to be permanently located in Washington in close 
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proximity to the White House. Clearly, such an arrangement, 
lacking general accountability, could not discourage the 
politicisation of the two international bodies, whose directors 
adamantly claim paramount loyalty to the bodies themselves 
instead of to the member countries whose development they are 
supposed to promote (Adams 1991:67). The Bank would prove a 
most effective instrument in advancing American economic 
interests. 
Currently, the World Bank succeeds by promoting policies which 
aim to undermine orthodox Keynesian development economics in 
favour of a market incentives approach. Both the Bank and the 
IMF are strong advocates of financial liberalisation and 
deflationary structural adjustment programmes: 
They each chart the progress of a global institution moving 
away from the discourse of basic needs and redistribution 
with growth (the MacNamara-Chenery years), and towards a 
discourse which hails the creativity of the international 
capital markets and which warns dissenting nations that 
there is no viable alternative to adjustment (Corbridge 
1992:288). 
The precepts are made explicit in the development policies and 
projects which the Bank and other lenders seek to promote in 
developing countries. 
5.15 Development Inc. 
The development industry, spear-headed by the World Bank, is 
an extremely influential caucus of international "players" who not 
only manipulate The West's international relations with· the Third 
World, but also the way it views critical global problems a!ld the 
directions it may take in seeking solutions for those problems: 
What we have here, therefore is a publicly-funded 
enterprise, charged with grave international responsibilities, 
that has not only been permitted to wall off its inner 
workings from the public view but that also sets its own 
goals, establishes how these goals are to be attained and, in 
due course, passes judgement on its own efforts (Hancock 
1989:xiv). 
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The development industry includes a large number of 
organisations whose primary objective Is to persuade public 
opinion that aid is an undoubted good and that formidable 
difficulties in developing countries are slowly but surely being 
resolved. Yet after nearly half a century of such 'development' 
assistance, the Third World's problems are worse than ever, 
despite the many billions of dollars in aid and loans poured into 
development projects. Foreign aid is alleged to be worth almost 
$60 billion dollars per year (Hancock 1989:xiv). The Third World 
debt is approximately $1.3 trillion dollars (Adams 1991:65). Yet 
from the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, till 1990, debtor 
countries in the South have remitted to their creditors in the 
North, an average of $6.5 billion dollars in interest payments 
alone (George 1992:xiv). This suggests that the behaviour of 
development organisations has been something less than 
altruistic: 
If the goals of official debt managers were to squeeze the 
debtors dry, to transfer enormous resources from South to 
North and to wage undeclared war on the poor continents 
and their people, then their policies have been an 
unqualified success. If, however, their strategies were 
intended - as these institutions always claim - to promote 
development beneficial to all members of society, to 
preserve the planet's unique environment and gradually to 
reduce the debt burden itself - then their failure is easily 
demonstrated (George 1992:xiii). 
If the IBRD (the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) and the IDA (the International Development 
Association), are included, the World Bank Group is the Third 
World's single largest creditor having lent $182 billion there. This 
is one seventh of the $1.3 trillion dollars owed to the thousands of 
other lenders (Adams 1991 :65). As a major lender, the Bank, and 
to a lesser extent the IMF, have been powerful players in the 
international business of development assistance to poor 
countries. 
The World Bank acts as a kind of chameleon organisation having 
mastered the art of being all things to all countries and 
accountable only to those it chooses, or to those to which it cannot 
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help being subservient. It shares these qualities with many 
agencies of the UN and other international development bodies, 
qualities reflected in the personnel: 
At every level of the multi-lateral agencies, maladjusted, 
inadequate, incompetent individuals are to be found clinging 
tenaciously to highly-paid jobs, timidly and indifferently 
performing their functions and, in the process, betraying the 
world's poor in whose name they have been appointed 
(Hancock 1989:99). 
In spite of its organisational charter obliging it to assist 
development m the South, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) managed to turn in a 
healthy profit of $1.1 billion dollars in 1987 (Hancock 1989:53). 
This important arm of the World Bank is almost an orthodox bank 
and has never allowed clients to reschedule loans or default on 
their interest repayments. Partly for this reason, it is highly-
regarded as a credit-worthy institution on Wall Street. But it also 
acts as a lender to some of the poorest and riskiest countries on 
the planet. By a sleight of hand, it manages this in two ways. 
Firstly, there is the IBRD' s strict business-like approach to 
repayments on loans. Defaults are verboten. No borrower is 
willing to risk the wrath of such a powerful creditor and lose 
access to its credits in the future by defaulting. Secondly, the 
Bank is well protected from the risky nature of its position by the 
enormous strength of its capital base which is made up of 'paid-in' 
and 'callable' capital from member governments. In return for 
this support, rich countries receive political and economic 
leverage from their control of an influential multi-lateral 
development institution (Hancock 1989:54 ). It is important to 
note that the financial support from wealthy member nations 
ultimately derives from the pockets of their tax-paying publics, 
who must bear the consequences were the Bank to fold. · And 
since there is no way that this bank can be regarded as a free-
floating independent entity, it should be accountable to the same 
taxpayers. Instead, it treats both the lending and the borrowing 
public as incidental to its main concern, which appears to be the 
transfer of wealth to privileged elites, not excluding its own 
highly-paid bureaucrats, the "patricians at public expense", who 
preside over the Bank and the lives of the world poor. 
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5.16 The Global Reach of the World Bank 
There is no doubt that the World Bank has shown a great deal of 
resourcefulness as a global lender. It has refined and extended its 
financial management skills to a point where, according to Adams, 
its role in the debt crisis has gone far beyond loans to major 
influence. Using its vast resources: 
the best-endowed development agency on earth, with the 
largest staff and an army of economists, it has drawn up 
investment plans for Third World governments, arranged 
financial packages for major capital investment opportunities 
in the Third World, signed framework agreements with the 
industrialised countries' aid agencies, managed multi-million 
dollar trust funds for cash rich countries, and organised 
consultative group meetings of other aid donors to tens of 
billions of dollars worth of loans (Adams 1991: 68). 
The Bank also promotes a Joil.).t Programme of Action to 
implement its goals by joining with the UN and its agencies, the 
European Community, and the other development organisations to 
'assist', for example, in African development. Hancock paints a 
disconcerting picture of the reality behind the gilded doors of an 
institution originally founded to promote the welfare of 
underprivileged developing countries: 
... a gang of vainglorious economists and bureaucrats in 
Washington, without experience of poverty, want to pull 
donors together so that they can effectively control all aid 
flows to the world's poorest continent; once they have done 
that, they will be in a strong position to cow recalcitrant 
governments and prevent them playing one donqr off 
against another; they will also be able to support those 
governments which are willing to "reform" by bearing some 
of the economic and political costs of the necessary 
repression (Hancock 1989: 129). 
According to Adams (1991), the Bank's influence is immense in 
the Third World, where it has sought to remove borrowing 
agencies out of the sphere of local politics. For this purpose it h~s 
created autonomous institutions such as development finance 
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banks, agricultural credit institutions and energy agencies to do 
the borrowing within foreign countries. There are many 
examples of small government agencies and institutions 
attempting unsuccessfully to thwart the Bank's plans for large 
loans and mega-projects. When three hydro-electric companies 
in Nepal balked at building large and risky dams in the 1960s, 
they were nationalised and a more pliant electricity sector set up 
(Adams 1991:68). In Colombia, the World Bank became a 
powerful administrative arm of the government, strong enough 
to bypass governmental decision-making, including the 
legislative and judicial branches. Puppet institutions were set up 
to undermine national democratic ones because, for the Bank, 
there has never been a place for wide popular participation in 
development decision-making, either in the Bank itself or outside 
it. Unfortunately for the poor in borrower nations, foreign capital 
has been monopolised to carry out the Bank's expansionist 
program, leaving little to spend on public health, education and 
transportation. 
According to Chossudovsky (1992), the IMF and the World Bank 
forced India to accept what is, in effect, indirect rule by outside 
forces. He claims that under a series of agreements with these 
institutions, India was offered $3.5 billion dollars as an incentive 
to structurally adjust its economy. The Bank's asessment of the 
problems bedevilling the Indian economy was the standard free 
market deregulation formula: 
India's industry has never achieved its potential. Along with 
highly protective trade policies, excessive regulation is to 
blame. Plants remain uneconomically small technical 
progress is slow and capacity 1s underused (World 
Development Report 1991). 
Here a rationale is being built for provision of funds with strings. 
rne money comes after compliance. Not surprisingly, these 
measures are already devastating governmental control of 
monetary and fiscal policy, with drastic consequences for many of 
India's 870 million inhabitants (Chossudovsky 1992:271 ). In one 
of the world's most complex and diverse economies, this kind of 
multi-lateral international meddling has caused havoc and 
stagflation at a time when inflation has been forced down in the 
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major world economies. The price of rice has risen in India by 50 
per cent while purchasing power has been reduced, thus 
dampening demand for home-produced products. The big 
business families in partnership with foreign capital are rapidly 
entering into a variety of sectors previously reserved for small-
scale industry, while rural subsidies and wages have been slashed 
m accordance with IMF prescriptions: 
In India, there are several hundred million farm workers, 
artisans, traders and others surviving on per capita incomes 
substantially lower than 50 cents a day while domestic 
prices are moving up to world levels. The increase in the 
cost of rice and wheat by 50 per cent since 1991, is pushing 
large numbers of rural people into chronic starvation. 
Nothing on this scale has been seen since the great famines 
in Bengal in the early 1940s (Chossudovsky 1992:272). 
In only two districts of Andra Pradesh between August and 
November 1991, 73 cases of death by starvation were reported. 
The IMF and World Bank programmes have succeded not in 
eliminating poverty, but eliminating the poor (Chussodovsky 
1992:273 ). 
5.17 The World Bank's Development Record 
The World Bank's self-acclaimed expertise in the area of economic 
development has never been impressive; in fact it has often been 
the cause of devastating and irreversible social and 
environmental disruptions, as in India. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
its enthusiasm for commodities exploitation pushed many 
countries in the Third World into developing their mineral 
resources and switching their farmers from subsistence and 
small-scale market crops to monocrop plantations for export. 
World markets quickly became glutted with co.rn:peting 
commodities, which resulted in plunging prices and disruptions in 
Third World economies. As an economic advisor, the Bank's 
record, according to Adams, is less than outstanding: 
A review of 1,015 projects by the Bank's Economic Advisory 
Staff revealed a "striking degree of uncertainty in predicting 
its project's rate of return". A study by the Overseas 
Development Council found that almost half of the World 
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Bank's loans to revenue-generating projects failed to 
achieve a desirable rate of return (Adams 1991 :70). 
The Bank's own Operations Evaluations Department found, m 
1987, that out of a representative sample of 189 projects, 60 per 
cent either had 'serious shortcomings' or were 'complete failures' 
(The Ecologist 1992:259). In sub-Saharan Africa, 75 per cent of 
all agricultural projects audited were found to have failed. More 
extensive audits in 1988 found even higher failure rates 
particularly in the poorest areas of the Third World. Only nine 
agricultural projects between 1961 and 1975 achieved any kind 
of sustainability (Hancock 1989: 145). 
Yet, in spite of this consistently appalling record of investment, 
the World Bank and its affiliates continue to enjoy blue chip 
status. Pension funds, insurance companies, corporations and 
individual investors, few of which would lend their money 
directly to the Third World, are eager to buy World Bank bonds 
because these come guaranteed by the richest governments in the 
world. But if the 155 member countries, the shareholders of the 
World Bank, ever tried to privatise · it, as the Bank is assiduously 
attempting to do with Third World economies through structural 
adjustment (Khor 1990:99), they would find very few private 
investors willing to consider a bank whose assets overwhelmingly 
consisted of loans taken out to pay previous ones. Again, without 
rich country guarantees, the individuals and institutions who now 
invest in World Bank bonds would refuse new offerings. Existing 
bondholders would find they were holding junk bonds, almost 
worthless, m what would be the world's riskiest portfolio 
(Hancock 1989:73 ). 
5.18 "Development" Projects 
The results of failed investment policies by Western donors has 
left the Third World, according to Hancock (1989), littered with 
the carcasses of white elephant projects which have had appalling 
human and environmental consequences. Third World, hydro 
(and thermal) powered electricity-generating plants account for 
25 per cent of all debt. The Bank must bear responsibility for 
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much of the farm and forest destruction, for induced earthquakes, 
diseases, alteration of hydrological regimes, erosion of coastlines, 
and the re-ordering of rivers and land around which many 
millions of people had organised their lives (Adams 1991:21 ). 
Brazil is the best and worst example of a Third World country 
whose debts have been allowed to run amok and which are now 
affecting much of its social and environmental life. It is the 
world's largest debtor, having piled up 25 per cent of its $111 
billion foreign debt to subsidise what have turned out to be 
largely unneeded electricity programs (Adams 1991 :50). 
Firstly, there is Itaipu, the largest hydro-electric dam m the 
world. It cost $20.5 billion to build, with incalculable human and 
environmental costs. The area flooded was 1,500 square 
kilometers of tropical forest and farmland, drowning Sete Quedas, 
one of South America's best known natural cataracts, and 
fracturing the lives of 40,000 Ava-Guarani Indians. The latter 
were simply forced to shift without proper compensation. This 
unprofitable project not only saddled the Brazillian poor with an 
$8 billion debt, but destroyed the habitat of 252 known species of 
birds and other animals including armadillos, tapirs, crocodiles 
and deer (Adams 1991 :50). 
Not long after the completion of Itaipu, the Brazillian Government 
built Tucurui, another mega-dam, this time submerging 2,400 
square kilometers (216,000 hectares) of rainforest. Some 2.8 
million trees were left to rot in place, having been sprayed with 
the dioxin, agent orange. Forty people lost their lives as a result, 
and a number of full drums were left in the dam to burst later 
above the water supply of the state capital, Belem (George 
1988:157). Up to 30,000 people were forcibly pushed of~ their 
land to serve 'the national interest'. This time $5 billion were 
added to the debt, requiring new loans for the interest alone. 
Even the dam-building industry considered this a waste, but in 
the world of development those who can, will, because: 
usually the money supplied by international development 
agencies combined with the muscle of borrower 
governments, is enough to enforce acceptance of any scheme 
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however irrelevant, cruel, unusual or hare-brained (Hancock 
1989: 150). 
Brazil's next pharaonic project was the Balbina Dam. This was 
conceived in the 1970s at the height of the OPEC oil crisis and the 
Third World's borrowing binge. Balbina would help to shake off 
Brazil's dependence on imported oil, but it would not do it by 
much. Even compared with Tucurui this was not a viable project; 
it was only expected to generate a modest 80 megawatts after 
flooding 236,000 square kilometeres of rainforest (Gribel 
1990:133). By contrast, Tucurui produced 8000 megawatts 
flooding a comparable area. The dubious economics of the project 
saw the project gradually stall until, in 1986, the World Bank 
again intervened, putting up a loan of $500 million to allow 
completion. The Brazilian government then moved to defuse 
opposition to the dam with a media campaign of questionable 
veracity. It also closed the floodgates a month early before any 
precautions had been taken to remove the wildlife or clear the 
vegetation. This action turned the flooded area (of twice the 
extent expected) into a rancid, poisonous body of water that 
reduced the local Indian population by two-thirds. 
But development disasters are not restricted to the rainforests of 
South America, where environmental and human impoverishment 
seem more the norm than the exception. When Third World 
development 1s driven by foreign investment, engineering 
miracles, especially large dams, have turned out to be technical 
and financial nightmares for those who must repay the debts. For 
the beneficiaries of course, no project ever fails: 
More often than not big, fanciful, extravagant and. high-tech, 
such schemes do, however, meet the bureaucratic needs of 
the agencies themselves, the psychological and career needs 
of their staff and the commercial needs of their suppliers 
from whom equipment and supplies are procured (Hancock 
1989:151). 
There is little evidence to suggest that the Bank is capable of 
learning from its past errors, the kind it made in Ghana in the 
1950s and 1960s. Funding the giant Akosombo Dam on the Volta 
River only benefited foreign business and local elites. The local 
CHAPTER 5 P59 
poor were not even supplied with electric lights. The effects of 
damming this river caused widespread endemic onchocerciasis 
(river blindness). 70,000 people have lost their sight since 
completion (Hancock 1989: 140). Parasitic. waterborne 
schistosmiasis has also disabled 80,000 more and 1 per cent of the 
population has been displaced without compensation. 
The Chixoy hydro-elecric dam in Guatemala is an example of 
inexplicable technical mismanagement characteristic of Western-
financed Third World projects. Six months after completion in 
1983, this dam was rendered inoperable when a 26-mile tunnel 
feeding water to the power station collapsed. It had been cut 
through unstable geological formations of soluble gypsum. 
Repairs delayed the work for another two years and raised the 
cost of the dam from an original $340 million to $1 billion 
(Hancock 1989:150). A western consortium, led by the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, were at hand to 
lend more money to see the project finalised. Even when soil 
eros10n threatened to cripple this project, the same group 
financed corrective action (which included re-aforestation and soil 
reclamation). By then, the economic boon had become a third of 
Guatemala's $2.5 billion foreign debt (Adams 1991 :32). 
This pattern of massive cost blowout for no return is repeated 
elsewhere. In Zaire, for example, the Inga-shaba hydroelectric 
project and power transmission line was originally expected to 
cost only $450 million but by the time of completion, had blown 
out to over $1 billion and the power was no longer needed. 
Typically, western-built and funded dams have been an enormous 
burden even after completion, which is almost always ~ttributable 
to unnecessary haste and insufficient supervision by foreign 
designers and builders. The Tavera and Valdesia dams .in the 
Dominican Republic are a financial drain on this already poor 
country. There is a continuous need for fresh loans to m51intain 
the dams and prevent siltation from the surrounding deforested 
hills. In Ghana, as in Peru, the World Bank-financed dams would 
not fill to capacity because, as designers discovered, the water 
supplies were insufficient. All these failed projects are now 
helping to bankrupt their countries' economies (Adams 1991:33), 
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It is a similar story with dams designed for irrigation schemes 
several of which have waterlogged and salinised millions of acres 
in poor countries. Needy India lost 20 per cent more land in Uttar 
Pradesh through waterlogging than was irrigated. Other 
accessories to the destruction in poor countries are an increased 
use of fertiliser, pesticides, mechanisation and monocrops. 
Although gigantic hydro-electric and irrigation projects have been 
major contributors towards national debts, there are others. As 
already noted, it was during the 1970s that the bulk of the Third 
World's $1 trillion debt was incurred. Developing countries 
undertook an estimated 1,614 megaprojects with an average cost 
of $612 million, a quarter in the oil sector, 20 per cent in mining, 
and over half for infrastructure, including roads, electric power, 
agriculture and communications (Adams 1991 :52). State 
enterprises seemed always to favour big projects costing vast 
sums, especially by electricity companies - though as we have 
seen, this has not been mere accident. 
As with more conventional forms of generation, nuclear power 
investment projects have been another means of increasing Third 
World debt. Mexico's was expanded considerably by its two 
reactors at Veracruz, originally projected at $1 billion and 
eventually finished after two decades at a cost of $4 billion. 
Ferdinand Marcos committed the Philippines to having two 
reactors built by Westinghouse on the Bataan Peninsula. The 
original estimate of $500 million blew out to $2.8 billion for a 
single reactor. This whole project was riddled with 'irregularities', 
among which was the choice of site at the foot of a volcano in the 
middle of the Pacific fire rim zone, an area of high seismic activity 
(Adams 1991:125 ). This reactor remains too dangerous to 
commission, but its costs still account for 10 per cent of the 
Philippines' national debt. Yet the Bank (whose self-acclaimed 
expertise in the area of development outranks all others) is 
unable to recognise solutions (or indeed real causes) for the 
disastrous state of the Philippine economy. Instead, it lamely 
states that: 
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the country faces substantial constraints such as low levels of 
resource mobilisation, a heavy burden of foreign debt, rising 
domestic debt, and, depite some reductions in absolute 
numbers since 1986, widespread poverty in urban and rural 
areas (The World Bank Annual Report 1992:123). 
An additional World Bank-sponsored scheme that has resulted in 
massive social and ecological destruction is the series of notorious 
resettlement schemes decreed by undemocratic governments to 
move people to places more 'suitable'. Both Brazil and Indonesia 
have executed such programmes with the help, blessing, and 
funding of multi-lateral and bilateral lenders, always flagshipped 
by the World Bank. The Indonesian 'Transmigrasi' program was 
intended to move some 20 million people from Java into the less 
crowded outer islands. The impact on native tribal people and the 
environment was not considered relevant, and the result has been 
destitution of migrants and widespread destruction of tribal life 
and forests. Transmigrasi was expected to add some $3.5 billion 
to Indonesia's debt, thus absorbing 6 per cent of national 
spending (George 1988: 158). 
Resettlement projects in Brazil have been similarly disruptive. 
Millions of landless peasants and many thousands of cattle 
ranchers have penetrated the protective defenses of the Amazon 
forests along the World Bank-financed highway BR-364. Within a 
few years of its completion, the smokey results of slash-and-burn 
clearing have become visible from space. This, "the world's most 
concentrated, diverse and ordered habitat, has become a commons 
that is fast devolving into a desert" (Adams 1991:29). After the 
soil is impoverished by inappropriate peasant farming, the cattle 
ranchers (supplying western take-away hamburgers) move in to 
enjoy the Brazillian Government's huge cattle subsidies which 
between 1975 and 1986 cost the country over $1 billion (Adams 
1991 :29). 
In addition, Brazil has put forward a "Greator Carajas 
Developoment Program," a $62 billion plan to create an agro-
industrial complex of mines, smelters, dams, railroads, ports, 
ranches and plantations, in the middle of the Eastern Amazonian 
jungle. It will utilise an area the size of Great Britain and France 
combined. To fuel the smelters, 58,000 square kilometers of 
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rainforest would need to be converted to charcoal, changing a 
pristine environment to something resembling a nuclear winter. 
In the state of Rondonia, after subsidising extensions to Highway 
BR364, the World Bank subsequently lent this state $99 million to 
combat the plague of mosquitos which had previously been 
restricted to the forest canopy. DDT was the Bank's choice of 
pesticide (Adams 1991 :31). 
According to Hancock, Brazil and Indonesia might be regarded as 
two countries 'waging the equivalent of thermonuclear war on 
their territories' (Hancock 1991: 138). The World Bank argues 
defensively that "where development is taking place, it 
(enviromental devastation) cannot be halted, only directed." It 
adds that the Bank can only influence events in such areas "by 
being part of the action" (Hancock 1991:138). But as Hancock 
rightly notes, this bank's own totally benign self image as w1se, 
gentle and far-sighted, hardly tallies with reality: 
It has been 'at best a case of the blind leading the blind. At 
worst, and far more frequently, it participates in a kind of 
destructive synergy: working as a team with its client of the 
day, it can make things much, much worse for the poor and 
for the environment than would have been possible 
otherwise (Hancock 1991:138). 
5.19 Capital Flight 
Much of the Third World is a commons, a free for all where the 
world's major players, the rich and powerful governments and 
their compradors, have increased (and continue to increase) the 
strength of their positions at the expense of the masses. Nowhere 
is this more starkly borne out than in the collusion between 
western governments, banks, businesses and aid agencies to 
transfer as much as possible of the capital wealth of the "South, 
Northwards. A significant part of such transfers is somewhat 
loosely termed "capital flight", a cosy arrangement between' banks 
and government officials to return sovereign loans as deposits 
into the accounts of those holding positions of power in Third 
World countries. The capital, which in fact left the debtor country 
long ago or may not have even arrived there from the bank, 
would still appear on the bank's books as a loan on which interest 
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must be paid. George claims major western banks encouraged 
such colTuption because it was easy money: 
(The banks were) paid back twice for a single commitment; 
first in deposits from foreigners, then in interest. As one 
economist remarks, "the most aggressive banks, such as 
Citibank, have probably accumulated as much in assets from 
poor countries as they have loaned to them. Their real role 
has been to take funds that Third World elites have stolen 
from their governments and to loan them back, earning a nice 
spread each way (George 1988:20). 
The Bank of International Settlements announced in its annual 
report in 1983, that not only was capital flight taking place on a 
large scale, but that $55 billion was shifted Northwards out of 
Latin America between 1977 and 1983. In 1986, Morgan 
Guaranty estimated that as much as 70 per cent of new loans 
made to Latin American countries was returned as capital flight 
(George 1988:20). 
By 1988, the overall theft had nsen to $130 billion, a sizable 
amount considered sufficiently large to service the region's debt 
for years to come (George 1988:20). This is premised on the vain 
hope that bankers would move to help in returning the stolen 
funds. New York bankers saw no moral issue in accepting flight 
capital, arguing that if they did not, Swiss Banks would not 
hesitate to do so. Indeed, bankers facilitated the process, by 
devising complex mechanisms to ferry 'flight' money away from 
its rightful owners. These creative devices included off-shore 
trusts, fake investment companies and parallel foreign exchange 
swaps to avoid national banks. They even manufactured 'back-
to-hack loans', in which the bank loaned clients their o~n money. 
Marcos provides a good example. By the time of his overthrow in 
1986, he had burdened the Philippines with a $26 billion debt 
much of which had been to finance socially useless development 
projects. After Marcos had been overthrown, investigations 
confirmed the staggering level of debt, $10 billion of which had 
been secreted out of the country (Hancock 1991:175). This was 
capital flight on a grand scale, made possible because multi-lateral 
and bi-lateral lenders were unwilling to take responsibility for 
the consequences of their lending. Marcos's debts will continue to 
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burden generations who have received little or no benefit from 
them. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the Philippines' exports will 
go just to cover interest payments (Hancock 1991: 175). 
In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko bears more than a little resemblance 
to Marcos. His regime is characterised by detention without trial, 
torture, murder, and disappearance, and he himself has spirited 
almost $4 billion out of the country, investing it in real estate on 
the Continent and in the US. He is reputed to have become one of 
the world's richest men since taking power in 1965 via a CIA-
backed coup (Hancock 1991:178). The IMF refuses to see 
Mobutu' s shortcomings and has arranged to reschedule his 
repayments eight times, with new loans and enforced austerity 
programmes on a suffering population: 
life for the average Zairan has never been so hard. Real 
wages are a tenth of what they were at independence; 
malnutrition is chronic; 80 per cent of the people live in 
absolute poverty. Official theft continues unabated and the 
people are bled, yet Zaire still receives plenty of new 
money. The World Bank loaned the Mobutu government 
over $1 billion, including $4375 million between 1984 and 
1986 alone. The IMF has instituted its usual measures 
(George 1988:106). 
The amount of capital that has flown the country through 
Mobutu's hands is almost the size of the county's debt and yet no 
steps have been taken to enforce its return to the rightful owners. 
Between 1976 and 1986, Mexico lost $56 billion in illicitly 
exported capital, while rich Venezuelans sent out $44.2 billion to 
western banks between 1983 and 1985 (Hancock 1991: 187). 
Hancock claims western aid often condones the behaviour of such 
'kleptocracies', encouraging them in their costly delusions of 
grandeur and providing them with the wherewithal to keep up 
the bad work (Hancock 1991:176). Yet, according to a World Bank 
publication, capital flight is merely: 
an elusive concept, statistically hard to distinguish from the 
normal capital flows generated by trade relations and by 
growing world financial integration (World Development 
Report 1991:124). 
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5.20 In The Name Of Security 
An essential ingredient in the maintenance of Third World 
military regimes has been debt-financed militarisation. The 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has 
concluded that 20 per cent of Third World debt can be attributed 
directly to arms purchases (George 1988:22), and this figure 
excludes OPEC countries which spent up on expensive military 
hardware (unlike non-oil producers who were restricted to more 
modest purchases). After the 1982 cutbacks in loans, the 
proportion of poor country budgets spent on armaments has 
remained as high as $170 billion per year (World Development 
Report 1991:140). Somewhat irrationally, the IMF consistently 
pressured its clients to make cuts in civil spending while allowing 
arms to continue unaffected. Thus those least able to afford the 
expense have been the largest buyers of arms because, in 
dictatorial regimes, the most pressing threat to national security 
comes from a country's own oppressed people. 
The United States has been a major supplier of weaponry to such 
reg1mes. Out of the $54 billion debt that Argentinians carry, $10 
billion can be traced to military expenditure by the regime's 
generals (George 1988:22). Peru under President Garcia wasted 
over half of the country's yearly budget on arms. Between 1972-
1982, non-oil producer Third World countries increased their 
share of world arms transfers to 41 per cent, which accounts for 
twenty per cent of borrowing for every year of that decade when 
the debts were being accumulated (George 1988:24). To suggest 
that such wasteful and non-productive loans have brought 
beneficial development to poor countries seems highly 
imaginative. More realistically, the security provided has been 
for ruling elites and foreign multi-nationals. 
5.21 The Impact Of US Military Spending 
The debt pile in the Third World is not simply due to the military 
spending of Third World puppet regimes. It is also due in part to 
arms spending by the United States. In the early 1980s, America 
embarked on a massive arms programme on which the Reagan 
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administration spent nearly a third of its federal budget. By 
1986, it had wasted $140 billion of foreign assets and its foreign 
debt had risen to $250 billion, with a total public debt of some $2 
trillion: 
What the Reagan era did was to dramatically accelerate the 
rate of decline while masking its dire consequences m a 
reign of heady unreality (Burstein 1988:33 ). 
It is widely recognised that the US economy is badly in need of 
the IMF formula for structural adjustment. It needs to cut 
spending, raise taxes and export more goods abroad. But 
according to Hirst and Thompson (1992), it is unable to take any 
of these measures because internal socio/political reasons prevent 
it from simply adopting more solidaristic and co-ordinative 
relations between labour, industry and the state. Hence the 
difficulty of competition with Germany and Japan. And since the 
IMF is an instrument of the G-7 western government group led by 
the United States itself, it will not act to enforce austerity 
programmes on this, the world's largest debtor, especially in the 
area of arms spending. Consequently, America must borrow 
continuously to fund its huge deficit by attracting loans with high 
interest rates. When it overborrowed in the 1980s, it brought on 
an increase in the rates on Third World debts because the United 
States' rate is, for most practical purposes, the world rate. At the 
same time, it may be said that America occupies a strong position 
in the world economy, at least while its dollar remains the world 
currency. If it chose, it could wipe out much of its debts by 
devaluing its currency to a very low level, at the cost of triggering 
off renewed global inflation (George 1988:26). The fact that this 
would effectively destroy the world economy must be a source of 
some restraint. 
5.22 Conclusion 
A development model along western lines will necessarily have 
limited relevance in the populous South, and this has undoubtedly 
been the reason it was offered to countries wanting development. 
Perhaps it is fortunate that the world has not yet seen an India or 
a China industrialised to the level of Japan. The resource demand 
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and inevitable pollution would quickly reduce the quality of life 
on the planet. However, this is an unlikely scenario given the lack 
of progress in Third World development since 1945. The present 
dominant western order exists at the expense of an undeveloped 
exploitable world. This is not an argument based on a conspiracy 
theory of history. There are presently a great many forces 
converging m a single direction, whose agents need not conspire if 
they have the same world view, aspire to similar goals and 
willingly take concerted steps to attain them. Co-operation 
between western corporations, governments, the UN, global 
lenders and development aid agencies is such a convergence 
which keeps the Third World in line (George 1988:5) and 
conserves the essential structures supporting the hegemony of a 
western economic order. 
For some, it is a means for reversmg the social democratic gams of 
the last 60 years, where: 
a climate of ideas associated with the New Right may 
condition economic and political actors to accept a situation 
which by other lights would appear unstable and unjust 
(Corbridge 1992:286). 
This counter-revolution in development thinking includes a 
continuing optimism about a spontaneous recovery of the world 
economy, based on market perfectability and export-led growth 
out of national debt. It lays stress on local responsibility for 
indebtedness and non-development and on the notion that debt-
relief is not just expensive, but "morally unsound' (Corbridge 
1992:286). These are the very same policies imposed through the 
lending 'conditionalities' set by the World Bank and . the other 
members of what George (1988:5) has dubbed the 'consortium'. 
According to Bradley (1989), a resolution of the Third World debt 
crisis requires a degree of cooperation on behalf of the bor,rowers 
and lenders. It has been resisted by the highly influential policies 
of the US Treasury, as illustrated in the case of Mexico. In the 
four years since 1985, this debt-burdened country managed to 
meet its IMF obligations by submitting its economy to fiscal 
reform and cutting its budget by 8 per cent of GNP. It opened its 
markets, cutting trade restrictions by 50 per cent, and reduced its 
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average tariff rate from 29 to 14 per cent. As a result, imports 
surged by 47 per cent in 1988. Yet Mexico was forced to continue 
paying its creditors more than it could afford and consequently 
per capita consumption fell by 8 per cent. Per capita investment 
also dropped 23 per cent over the same period (1985-1987) as 
economic growth went into reverse. During this traumatic period, 
the US Treasury and the banks refused to allow any interest and 
debt relief, which would have provided a chance for Mexico to 
emerge from the deep pit of national debt. The commercial banks 
received a healthy 13.6 per cent average return on their Third 
World loans between the crisis years of 1982 and 1989, which 
questions the claim that they were in any real danger of collapse 
(George 1992:86). In the same years, these banks were paid some 
$386 billion by the Third World while they supplied it with only 
$43.5 billion in new loans. It is most unlikely that the difference 
could have been generated entirely from the earnings of Third 
World countries during the lean years of the 1980s. Instead, as 
George argues: 
There is strong evidence that these exceptionally high 
remittances from poor countries to banks since 1982 could 
never have been made without the help of public money -
taxpayer's money - from national or international public 
agencies. Loans from official creditors seem to have 
transitted via the books of Third World countries but were m 
fact used to pay back the banks, not to fund 'development' or 
provide for human welfare (George 1992:87). 
In 1985, The US secretary of the Treasury, Mr James Baker, 
launched his famous plan (bearing his name) in which the 
commercial banks were to renew lending fresh funds to fifteen 
major borrowers, as a means of stimulating investment in the 
developing world. It achieved a net transfer of some $76 billion 
in interest alone and $43 billion in net resources_ to rich creditors 
capital flight by raising the level of debt and lowering the 
confidence of domestic investors. Bradley claims this plan failed 
to achieve economic growth because it was non-specific, 
prescribing the same solution (new money) for countries as 
dissimilar as Brazil and Bolivia. The Brady Plan of 1989, also 
emanating from the US Treasury, sought to persuade the banks to 
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exchange 'a high value but insecure loan for a lower value but 
safer one' or that they should lend enough money to debtors to 
buy back their own debts at a discount. It required about $20 
billion of World Bank and IMF money and apart from being an 
inefficient use of development money, it was 'far too little and far 
too late' (George 1992:90). By 1991, Third World debtors were 61 
per cent more in debt to all creditors than they were in 1982; and 
35 per cent more in debt to the banks themselves. Also since 
1982, between $44 billion and $50 billion in tax relief on bank 
provisions and losses have been foregone by Northern taxpayers: 
The banks, the creditor governments and the international 
lending agencies have committed no crimes. The question of 
justice is another matter entirely (George 1992:92). 
For Bradley (1989:66), the solution for the debt problem is 
interest and debt relief. The error has been allowing banks to use 
bridging loans 'to make bad loans look good'. The banks should 
shoulder their responsibility for foolhardy investments and face 
the consequences, which is no more than acceptable business 
practice. They ought to absorb their losses. As an essential first 
step, any viable and just resolution of the Third World debt crisis 
should begin by removing it from the hands of financiers and 
economists. Matters involving sovereign debt disputes are 
deliberations for the International Court of Justice. But as Adams 
(Adams 1991: 168) notes, even here, international legal thinking 
has swung away from principle to pragmatism, with more concern 
for lenders than borrowers, a situation associated with the 
fostering of international trade and investment. 
In a sense, the Third World debt has replaced the overt chains of 
Third World colonialism in a neo-colonial world order. If benign 
Third World development had been the true aim of western 
countries, if it had been to extend the benefits of modernisation 
and technology to all the people of the planet, it has failed. On the 
contrary, there has occurred a progressive underdevelopment in 
Asia, Africa and the Americas where large populations have lost 
even the necessities for a simple healthy life. 
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In Latin America, where prox1m1ty to the United States ought to 
have induced advanced development, there 1s widespread 
indebtedness and poverty. Spending on health has fallen by 50 
per cent per head, while on education it has fallen by over 25 per 
cent in the last ten years (Jolly 1989:51). Debt and development 
continue to be defined and manipulated by institutional and 
private elites and as effective tools for controlling a captive Third 
World. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DEBT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
6.1 Introduction 
The last twenty-five years have seen ecological devastation across 
the globe. In the southern hemisphere it has been rampant, 
beginning seriously in the late 1960s, expanding in the 1970s and 
accelerating dramatically in the 1980s. The effects on human and 
natural systems have been deadly and unrelenting. Satellite 
pictures of smouldering rainforests are now too common to be 
remarkable. Desertification in rural areas, has turned previously 
productive land into dustbowls. This chapter focuses upon the 
connection between Third World debt, the adjustment policies of 
international institutions, deforestation and climate change. It 
scans the likely impact of a 'successful' conclusion of the GATT 
negotiations on Third World economies, the environment and the 
quality of life after 'harmonisation' in health standards. 
6.2 The Debt/Environment Connection 
Perhaps the Third World debt crisis is not exclusively the cause of 
environmental destruction in developing countries, but according 
to George (1992), it is a major contributing factor. Chapter Five 
examined the policies and structural adjustment programmes of 
major lenders. Countries in economic difficulties have been 
'encouraged' to exploit their natural capital, often at the expense 
of fragile ecosystems. Mega-dams, nuclear power plants, smelters 
fueled on rainforest timbers and huge industrial estates were 
thought to be viable sources of foreign exchange. After the debt 
crisis climaxed in 1982, structural adjustment programmes and 
austerity measures ensured that even 
needed. The resulting 'utilisation' 
environmental cost. 
greater resources were 
was at an enormous 
Export orientation policies (of the maJor lenders) encourage not 
only industrial scale agriculture but also the granting of huge 
timber and mining concessions, geared to short-term profit with 
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no thought for conservation. For George, such concentration of 
wealth and advantage in a few hands has led to poverty and 
marginalisation for the majority. For the same people it has 
meant severe despoilation of their environments: 
... poverty poses a grave threat to ecological balance. In 
country after country undergoing structural adjustment, poor 
people have become poorer still. The survival strategies they 
are forced to adopt place further pressures on the severely 
limited, fragile resource bases left at their disposal (George 
1992:3). 
Landlessness and land insecurity facing poor farmers are major 
causes of tropical deforestation. Social inequity is again directly 
linked with the environmental crisis as marginalised groups are 
forced off their land and into forests: 
... the land peasants need is in the hands of large landholders 
or governments who, benefitting from the rise of social 
systems under which power to allocate and use land has 
shifted from the community to outside patrons, the market or 
the state, are using it for non-subsistence purposes (World 
Rainforest Movement 1992:2). 
George argues that under the circumstances it is unfair to ask the 
poor to take the long term view, sparing the natural world, after 
being driven off their land. It is folly to expect a breadwinner to 
refrain from cutting down trees for charcoal and furniture when 
international companies are doing the same for woodchips and 
disposable chopsticks. 
v1ew: 
Navarro succintly paints a Third VI orld 
There's no doubt that poverty destroys the environment. If 
poor Salvadorans find turtle eggs, they're not going to think 
that in 50 years' time those eggs are going to produce more 
sea turtles. They know that selling those eggs for $10-$15 
means survivin2: for a week. What is oovertv? Well, it's a 
~--- ----- - --- - - 0 .L "' 
predator of the environment, not some abstract concept. 
There are poor people because there are rich people. Nobody 
chooses to be poor. To stop the deterioration of the 
environment, we have to overcome poverty (Navarro 
1993:13). 
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Quite often forests are set alight to provide pasture for cattle for 
the western fast-food outlets of international companies while 
austerity policies ensure environmental ministeries in developing 
countries are starved of funds. In the Philippines, for example, a 
monolithic 44 per cent of all government spending must go to 
debt-servicing (George 1992:4; Khor Kok Peng 1992:24). 
6.3 Debt-Driven Rainforest Destruction 
Deforestation is the destruction of one of the natural world's most 
important mechanisms for the removal and storage of excessive 
levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It is also a tragic loss 
of the largest remaining banks of biodiversity, much of which 
have yet to be catalogued. Traditional methods had allowed 
forests to remain productive while western development methods 
made no allowance for regeneration (Khor 1992: 18). This has 
caused the rainforests of the world to shrink at an enormous rate. 
It is claimed that by the year 2000 they will have largely 
disappeared (Gupta 1988:5). The situation for the other types of 
tropical vegetation is even worse as forests are rapidly destroyed 
in search for new agricultural land and fuelwood. The Siberian 
forests of the new Russian republics are now coming under severe 
threat of clear-felling as multi-nationals pressure for access. 
These forests presently cover some five million square kilometers, 
an area the size of the United States of America. 
Deforestation in developing countries is a global responsibility 
because of its serious impact on the conditions that support the 
entire biosphere. Northern attitudes which condone 
environmental abuse in the South, take little account of the fact 
' 
that ecological catastrophes will not recognise geographical 
borders. They also ignore the fact that major contributors to 
environmental depletion and pollution are residents of industrial 
rich countries whose past and present abuse of environmental 
commons have piled up a far greater ecological debt than all the 
Third World economic debt put together (Navarro 1983). This 
ecological debt will one day have to be paid. 
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6.4 Climate Change 
In 1990, the three hundred scientists who took part in a UN-
convened intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) 
concluded that immediate reductions of greenhouse gases by 60 
per cent were necessary to stabilise the concentrations at that 
year's levels. In the unlikely event that such reductions were 
achievable, the scientists warned that there was a strong 
possibility of 'positive feedbacks' amplifying the warming. An 
inordinate increase in greenhouse gases may cause a slight 
increase in ocean temperatures which in turn would release 
billions of tonnes of sea-stored carbon dioxide. The result would 
be unprecedented disruptions in every part of the world. 
Although about two-thirds of the greenhouse gases come from the 
activities of industrial countries, there are significant amounts 
from the South directly connected with its on-going debt crisis. 
Deforestation is the major source here, releasing large quantities 
of carbon to combine with methane and nitrous oxide, all 
'greenhouse gases'. The speed of deforestation is increasing these 
concentrations at a 'breathtaking' pace. Approximations in 1979 
ranged from 1.3 to 1.9 billion tonnes (gigatonnes). A decade later, 
this figure had risen to a conservative estimate of 2.0 to 2.8 
gigatonnes (George 1992:7). This represents a 50 per cent 
increase in deforestation-related greenhouse gases, over 20 per 
cent of the total contribution to global warming (Myers 1989). 
According to George, the connection between debt and 
deforestation is unambiguous: 
Certainly increased human pressures take their toll on 
tropical forests, but this is not so much the result of 
population growth as of marginalisation of huge numbers of 
poor people in debtor countries who no longer have a chance 
of finding a decent livelihood (George 1992:8). 
In Guatamala, some 80 per cent of the land is owned by 2 per 
cent of the population and as in many Third World countries, the 
only real solution for reducing the impact of the poor on their 
environment is immediate implementation of agrarian reform. 
According to Myers (1989), these people are increasingly victims 
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of the debt crisis, often pushed off their land for export crops. 
George (1992: 8) claims the effect of the debt crisis in the 1980s 
has accelerated Third World deforestation in the following ways: 
• Pressures to increase export earnings stimulate increased 
exploitation of timber. 
• The same pressures lead to the expansiOn of pasture and hence 
to the clearing of forests for beef exports. 
• Debt increases poverty and marginalisation, which m turn 
increases the exodus of poor people into forests in the hope of 
finding a means of subsistance. 
• Mangrove forests in coastal areas are destroyed to to make 
way for ponds to raise shrimp and prawns for export. 
Large scale mining also damages forests, as in the Carajas m Brazil 
and Bailadila in India, where the impact on fauna and flora has 
been immense. The Trans Amazon and Trans Sumatra highways 
have cut through virgin forests for transmigration programmes 
funded by the World Bank. These have been noted in Chapter 
Five. 
For George (1992: 1 0), the correlations between debt and 
deforestation are very close: 
Of the 24 largest debtors, 8 never had, or no longer have 
forest reserves significant on a world scale. Of the 16 
remaining major debtors ($10 billion or more), all are to be 
found on the list of major deforesters. The correlation is 
particularly strong for mega-debtors such as Brazil, , India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria (among the top 8 debtors) all of 
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In Indonesia and Brazil, the high rate of deforestation increase 1s 
especially alarming because these countries contain so much of 
the world's remaining reserves. About 43 per cent of the original 
forests in the Third World have already been lost and in countries 
like Brazil, this has happened mainly since 1980. 
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In the South, Papua New Guinea forests are rapidly being felled 
by Japanese and American companies who had previously 
exhausted the reserves in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
In Bolivia it is a holocaust only marginally less than Brazil's: 
Every year about 200,0000 hectares (500,000 acres) are 
estimated to be lost to timber extraction, cattle ranching and 
'shifted cultivators'. They have become a large and growing 
population in Bolivia since 1985 when the IMF and the 
Bolivian Government instituted one of the toughest austerity 
programmes ever enforced In Latin America (George 
1992: 15). 
6.5 The Debt-Trade-Environment Connection 
When the forty-four industrialised nations met at Bretton Woods 
in 1944, their main concern was reducing the possibility of 
another 1929 slump. As noted in Chapter One, this was thought to 
be best achieved by bringing the colonies under the control of a 
western 
expanding 
supply of 
countries. 
industrial system, thus providing a continuously 
market for their own manufacturers and maintaining a 
cheap food and raw materials from the undeveloped 
The World Bank and the IMF would make it difficult 
for Third World borrowers to repay their 'development' debts 
while western lenders 'managed' their currencies and interest 
rates. The GATT would prevent the same countries from 
becoming so developed that they could produce their own goods 
rather than buy them from First World producers (Goldsmith 
1990). Thus they were offered inappropriate and often 
unachievable development models. In this economic order, the 
Bank and the IMF have complemented the work of GATT in tying 
up many developing economies in conditions secure enough to 
keep them dependent on the West for decades. These same 
pressures were being exerted most strongly in the recent Round 
r 
of GATT negotiations. The 'successful' conclusion here will 
increase the widening gap between global rich and poor and will 
be the greatest threat yet to the world environment. 
TNCs already control 80 to 90 per cent of world trade in t~a, 
coffee, cocoa, cotton, forest products and other commodities such 
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as tobacco, jute, iron ore and bauxite. Yet the same companies 
pushed for and achieved further access through GATT in new 
areas as services, agriculture, textiles and intellectual property 
rights. According to Raghavan (1990:207), the TNCs' agenda is the 
removal of th"e few remaining restrictions limiting their total 
freedom for expansion. The push on new issues, Khor Kok Peng 
argues, is part of a grand design in which industrial countries will 
transform GATT into a world policeman to serve conglomerate 
interests (Khor Kok Peng 1990:208; Goldsmith 1990:204). At the 
same time, these interests are trying to downgrade or remove 
entirely what remains of the "development principle" from GATT 
rules. By this mechanism, less-developed countries have been 
allowed privileges and exemptions m recognition of their 
disadvantaged status. The intention was to inject a little 'fair 
trade' into free trade. In the recent Round, this principle has been 
ignored by industrial 
for the Third World. 
mean increased debt 
countries on the ground of equal treatment 
But competition on a 'level playing field' will 
and perpetual dependency for many small 
nations. This is the same market language of "adjustment, 
retrenchment, deregulation and openness" (Corbridge 1992:286) 
and has sinister implications, as explained by Hall (1986, cited in 
Goldsmith 1990:204 ): 
Freedom of investment- freedom to expatriate profits to 
manipulate local politics, to pay workers slave wages, to block 
social programmes, to spoil the environment unhindered by 
regulation - has been the true meaning of "free" in "free 
market". It involves stealing away national sovereignty, 
repressing labour organising and political parties, destroying 
self-sufficiency in food and basic goods (and imposing food 
and basic goods import dependency), keeping wages and the 
standard of living low, and broadening the gap b~tween the 
rich and poor. 
As already noted, Seabrook (1992: 15) observes an 'international 
monetary fundamentalism' sweeping the planet in the economistic 
ideology of the West, no longer inhibited by an antagonistic Soviet 
Union. As from the onset of 1995, the old GATT will be 
reinvented for the new world conditions: 
[It] will become reincarnated into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), its status on a par with the World Bank 
CHAPTER 6 P78 
and the IMF, two pivotal custodians of corporate 
aggrandisement and global imperialism (Clairmont 1993: 18 ). 
As an agent of dominant western interests, the GATT 
bringing about expansion of the world economy are as 
the self-proclaimed achievements of the World 
development. The former had more to do with a 
claims for 
fanciful as 
Bank m 
number of 
Keynesian policies and government interventions that promoted 
widespread expansion in the industrialised countries. According 
to Raghavan ( 1990:205), the effects of the GATT rounds "merely 
accommodated the TNCs' demands for greater freedom for their 
operations around the world, dealing essentially with issues of 
market access". A western ideology of dominance allows 
industrialised countries to resist giving Third World countries 
equal treatment with open access to their own markets while 
refusing reductions on products from developing countries. 
By the end of the 1970s, Third World countries had come to 
realise the hopelessness of trying to change the asymmetrical 
relationship with the industrial world. In spite of North-South 
dialogues, and calls for a more· equitable New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), developing countries had little to show for 
their troubles except for massive debts and an unequal flow of 
resources Northwards. Raghavan (1990) attributes the Third 
World debt crisis to the combined effects of OECD monetarism, 
high interest rates and a policy-induced recession. He claims that 
having frustrated the NIO's call for better trading conditions for 
the South and a period of structural adjustment of its economies, 
the United States has set about restructuring international 
economic relations according to its own interests. This is made 
clear in the direction of American influence in the Urug11ay Round 
and ought to be seen against the present state of the world 
economy and the declining hegemony of the United States (see 
Chapter T\vo). In this context, it may be that America is playing 
its final card at a time of waning influence in a unipolar world. 
Given the influence of the industrial countries and their support 
for international 'cooperation', coercing dependent Third World 
debtors was never a difficult task. 
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6.6 The GATT Crisis 
As noted earlier, transnational companies have seen the Uruguay 
Round as an opportunity to extend the 'free trade' principle out of 
the traditional areas of manufactured goods and into the new and 
more lucrative areas of services, investments and intellectual 
property rights. 
6.6.1 Services 
The area of services covers finance, media and communications, 
transport, tourism and professional business services. It is also 
the fastest growing sector of the developed economies having 
overtaken manufacturing. In many Third World countries these 
areas are often protected by laws preventing the entry of large 
foreign concerns likely to absorb the locally-owned and medium-
sized 'informal sector'. 
baniers broken down to 
lobbied hard through 
argument is as follows: 
Western service companies want the 
give them access to this market and have 
their governments. Generally, their 
• Because services have overtaken trade in importance, the free 
trade concept must now be extended to include them; 
• Since services require a presence in the importing country, the 
right of establishment must now be included. 
• Any discrimination against foreign firms (that is less than 
national treatment) is a violation of GATT and can bring on 
retaliation measures along a broad range of products. 
It is the possibility of cross retaliation (linking action in one area 
of trade or business to retaliation in another category of product, 
with so much power. 
6.6.2 Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
In many Third World Countries, certain restrictions apply to 
foreign corporations wishing to set up in there. Some examples 
are local content requirements, limits on the remittances of profit 
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abroad, and local equity requirements. Their governments 
reasonably argue that these measures are neccessary to protect 
the economies' balance of payments, to guard against unethical 
TNC practices, transfer pricing or monopolistic market allocation 
and to put a limit to TNC ownership of key sectors of national 
economies. They are not conditions for the restriction of trade but 
for ensuring a necessary degree of sovereignty. Developed 
countries have insisted that TRIMs both distort trade and are an 
influence on (their) costs and prices and should be abolished. 
Seabrook points to a degree of inconsistency in the attitude of 
developed countries: 
The disputes between the United States, Europe and Japan 
over agricultural subsidies under the GATT negotiations, have 
not prevented the western financial institutions from 
pressurmg Third World governments to cut subsidies and 
open their agricultural sector to 'free competition' (Seabrook 
1992:13). 
6.6.3 Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
The industrial countries have also demanded that intellectual 
property rights be included under GATT rules. They have insisted 
that their own laws governing patents, copyrights and trademarks 
apply worldwide. GATT will be the administering body. But for 
many developing countries this amounts to severe restrictive 
protectionism, preventing the diffusion of technology to them and 
therefore a serious hindrance to their development. The same 
restrictions run directly against the principle of liberalisation 
which industrialised countries appear to hold so dearly. For many 
m the South, the western order is consistent only in its selectivity: 
There are double standards in the industria,! world's 
approach; liberalisation if it suits us, protectionism too if it 
suits us - the real underlying principle is pure self-interest 
(Khor Kok Peng 1990:211). 
A uniform global system on patents will have far-reaching effects 
on countries such as India. Life-saving drugs currently 
manufactured up to twenty times more cheaply than imported 
ones would become unavailable to the poor when royalties must 
be paid. If the Dunkel proposals on agriculture are accepted, 
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seeds, plants and animals will also be patented, resulting in 
farmers being forced to pay royalties when replanting their own 
seed and on newborn animals. The injustice of such a situation is 
all the more poignant when it is remembered that much of the 
original germplasm was developed by poor farmers in the South 
over hundreds of years and given freely to the North. 
6. 7 GATT Environmental Implications 
In 1989, the Bush Administration presented its so-called "double 
zero" plan to all GATT member nations. This US proposal for 
global agricultural deregulation sought agreement for the 
elimination of farm subsidies around the world and the phasing 
out of all import tariffs. Had this been fully accepted, it would 
have had far-reaching implications for the environment. By 
altering the rules governing the trade in food, natural products, 
fish and forestry products, the proposals would "seriously limit 
the right of GATT members to implement a wide range of 
resource protection laws at local, provincial and national levels" 
(Ritchie 1990:214). 
The real aim of GATT is to pry open all the world economies. The 
"double zero" plan would force a sharp reduction in or totally 
eliminate domestic farm support programmes propping up small 
holders. Grain traders and agro-chemical firms see these as 
impediments to trade on a global basis and are using their 
considerable influence with the US government to have them 
eliminated (Ritchie 1990:214 ). The environmental effects of 
cutting back or removing farm support could put an end to a 
number of publically-financed conservation and env~ronmental 
programmes. These have been documented: 
• There 'vvill be an increase in land under cultivation as small 
farmers attempted to survive without subsidies, thus bringing 
over a hundred million acres back into production. 
• Farm and pasture land would be managed much more 
intensively, primarily through the use of more chemicals and 
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fertilisers. 
corporations. 
This would be a boon for agro-chemical 
40 Falling farm prices will leave small and medium-sized family 
farmers with less income, and less capacity to invest in more 
sustainable practices and soil and water management 
improvements. 
• Conservation-oriented farm programmes 
wildlife habitat protection schemes 
without government support. 
such as wetlands and 
could be eliminated 
• Families farming the land around the world could be replaced 
by absentee landlords and corporations more able to withstand 
the demands of increased competition. 
• Diversified livestock producers will be replaced by large-scale 
feedlots and confinement operations. This is likely to squeeze 
out small producers, cause environmental problems from 
concentrated manure run-off and the inevitable feedlot 
livestock diseases as well as an increased reliance on 
antibiotics and nuclear irradiation to control health threats. 
.. Small producers who have survived by growing specialty more 
environmentally sound crops will be pushed out by large 
producers entering their markets. 
• Conversion of farmland into industrial and commercial uses. 
Greenbelts and farms will probably become available for the 
purposes of factories, roads, shopping malls, housing, landfills 
and other developments (Ritchie 1990:215). 
The US GATT proposals mean that nations no longer have the 
right to limit the amount of agricultural and raw materials they 
import from cheap producers such as Australia, Canada, the US 
and Europe. Only small farmers who can afford to intensify their 
production will surv1ve and those who do will add to 
environmental damage. In Northern countries, organisations 
calling for bans on tropical timbers will be stymied just as those 
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trying to limit the import of hamburger meat grown on cleared 
South American rainforests will fail. It is important to note that 
any social or environmental concerns have been omitted from the 
5000-page GATT document (Thussu 1993: 16). 
The American proposal attempted to remove Article XI of the 
current GATT treaty which gives members the right to impose 
restrictions on the export of food and other critical resources m 
times of shortages. Such a removal will allow corporations to 
export desperately-needed food from an area of need in order to 
sell it for a higher price elsewhere. 
6.8 The Right to Healthy Food 
In the recent Round, corporations were also lobbying hard for 
new GATT rules to limit the right of countries to set their own 
food safety and environmental standards. The US "double zero" 
plan, according to Ritchie, would achieve this through the 
procedures of submitting all objections to the judgement of 
scientific "evidence". No social, economic, cultural or religious 
concerns could be considered, no matter how important (Ritchie 
1990:216). The Rome-based Codex Alimentarius (presided over 
by government officials and executives from chemical and food 
companies), will set minimum standards for toxic levels. The aim 
is to develop "harmonisation" of regulations and measures 
concerning the quality of animals, vegetables and food products 
and Codex Alimentarius will be the final arbiter of what is 
acceptable. 
The setting of minimum standards and the use of cross;retaliatory 
measures could bring about bizarre situations where high health 
standards and environmental safety will be illegal and 
opportunists may use the legislation to "greenmail" other 
countries by demanding compensation in return for not exporting 
high residue goods to them. Also farmers producing in countries 
with high standards will find themselves in competition with 
others in countries with lower standards. They may be forced to 
lobby their governments for lower standards to "level the playing 
field". This will almost certainly put them in conflict with 
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environmentalists and consumers. Finally, GATT "harmonisation", 
will restrict the ability of local and regional governments to set 
beneficial environmental and consumer protection standards, 
again for fear of triggering cross retaliatory measures through 
GATT laws (Ritchie 1990:217). 
6.9 Conclusion 
The environmental crisis m the South does not receive adequate 
attention because it is looked upon as a national problem or in the 
popular imagination as an Act of God. In neither case is it 
presented as a global political issue which would highlight the 
need for an adequate global response. Such a response would be 
certain to favour some interests over others in the world 
economy. An example may be the need for redistribution of 
available land to prevent landless peasant incursions into forested 
areas. Analyses linking heavy debt, development and 
environmental crises would be equally unpopular among those 
wishing to maintain the uneven relations between North and 
South and further the process of economic re-colonisation. This 
fact was made patently clear in the failure of the recent United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
1992, especially m the most important recommendations of 
Agenda 21, "the plan to save the earth". According to Jim 
MacNeill, Secretary General of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, the world is presently suffering 
from a form of institutional schizophrenia \vhere economic and 
ecological systems have become totally interlocked in the real 
world but remain almost totally divorced in its institutions (cited 
in Prins and Stamp 1991:136). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: A WAY FORWARD 
Introduction 
For the last half century, public consciousness has been focussed 
on the more dramatic 'dangers' of nuclear destruction during the 
manipulative years of the orthodox Cold War. This has facilitated 
a largely unquestioned exploitation of Third World poor and 
global natural resources. All have been justified in the names of 
growth, development and national interest. Yet the world is in 
turmoil. There is rampant poverty, unemployment and violence 
notwithstanding major advances in science and technology. What 
passes for a rational global economy is a thinly-cloaked attempt to 
impose a universal market system in the service of powerful and 
wealthy elites. 
The thesis has argued that although the orthodox Cold War rivalry 
has been relegated to history, the reality behind that particular 
facade has remained and is now more stark. The Cold War against 
the Third World poor persists and is proliferating into new areas. 
Its victims remain the same, passionately described by George: 
We witness the failure of a development model still 
enthusiastically endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank, the 
main managers of the debt system. It is a slow failure. It 
wounds and it tortures before it kills. In its current stage, the 
key element is the way debt drains countries of their 
material and spiritual resources. It is a violence; in response 
for some, violence seems the only or at least the best option 
(George 1992:166). 
There is an ongoing economic war for access to diminishing 
resources. So-called 'free' market policies preferred and imposed 
by global lenders have torn open and destroyed 
while impoverishing people and their 
Chossudovsky (1992:273) has suggested a degree 
environment. 
of global social 
engineering in which an unsustainable world population may be 
'culled' through the structural adjustment policies of the World 
Bank and the IMF. But these are only two of the institutional 
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tools at the disposal of the dominant order. There 1s also the 
GATT, whose agenda has been detailed in Chapter six. 
7.2 Global Forces In Opposition 
In spite of the complexity of global trends, it is possible to discern 
the motion of social, political and economic forces moving in 
contrary directions on the world stage. According to Ekins, the 
battle lines are now drawn with one side composed of "scientism" 
(the claim that a scientific worldview is the only one valid), 
"developmentalism" (a belief that human progress is only possible 
through consumerism) and "statism" (the claim that the nation 
state is the only legitimate form of political authority), backed by 
the battalions of the established order. These are modern 
technology, the institutions of world capitalism and state power. 
On the other side of the line stand the people, "principally the 30 
per cent of humanity that are disposable as far as the modern 
project is concerned but aided and abetted by many from the 
other 70 per cent who regard this project as ethically, socially, 
and environmentally intolerable" (~kins 1992:209). 
7.3 A "Global" Problem 
For Shiva (1992), the initial force behind the Green Movement has 
been somewhat dissipated. Its roots lay in local awareness which 
served to reveal the social and environmental costs of 
maldevelopment and the destructive role of globally powerful 
transnational and multilateral banks. The latter have since 
mounted a counter-offensive m which the language of 
environmental dissent has been absorbed, redefined and defused, 
so that: 
the 'local' has been written out of environmental concerns: 
no\v all environmental problems are portrayed as global 
problems requiring global solutions (Shiva 1992:258). 
This sleight of hand has been used to mask the fact that the 
world's major polluters are individual multinational corporations 
and military forces (Renner 1991: 132). 'Globalising' the problem 
merely shifts responsibility onto the shoulders of those who 
cannot alter the situation. State and business can then display 
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'appropriate' concern for the condition of the world while aiding 
and abetting its decline. 
The World Bank is such a 'global' institution and as an instrument 
of western development policies in Third World countries, has 
perpetrated a logical falsehood where the consequences of 
environmental destruction are transformed into its causes. Thus 
poverty and overpopulation are blamed for environmental 
degradation. Structural adjustment policies on the other hand, are 
seen as merely economic issues. 
A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and a 'level playing 
field,' as already noted, will facilitate removing those already 
teetering on the edge of survival. But it is unlikely that this kind 
of geo-social engineering will occur without resistance in the 
future. George argues that it is fatuous to expect stability in a 
Third World held in check by violence and poverty: 
As the development prospects of third world countries come 
increasingly to be determined by the debt crisis, so the terms 
and management of debt must be identified among the 
underlying causes of violence and conflict. When the 
ordinary conditions of life are a violence, a violent attempt to 
change them is only to be expected (George 1992:158-159). 
In the late 1980s, military spending in the Third World rose to a 
phenomenal $170 billion per year, with $38 billion spent on 
imports from the industrial countries (World Development Report 
1991: 140). Since the Gulf War of 1990 was a recent exception in 
being an inter-state war, it is not unwarranted to assume that 
much of the military hardware was intended for maintaining 
order within unstable countries made so by impossible socio-
economic conditions. In many cases the conditions promoting 
unrest were aggravated by the direction of scarce national 
education programmes. 
According to Finger, another term, "environmental security" seeks 
to overcome the distinction between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of the nation state which, he claims, 
are quite different, with individual security being subjective and 
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absolute while state security is relative to the relationship with 
other states. In the latter case, an increase in environmental 
threats to states in general (global environmental degradation), 
which does not affect the equilibrium of the nation state system, 
will not translate into a decrease in national security and will be 
ignored. This identification of state and individual interest can is 
also intellectually flawed when applied to environmental 
problems. Firstly, there is the assumption that individuals and 
states are identically affected by, have the same interests in, and 
are able to address and must collaborate in addressing 
environmental change. Secondly, it is based on an "American 
model of democracy", where the interest of the majority of 
citizenry is believed to be reflected in the will of the state. But all 
political systems do not perceive democracy in the same way and 
the "western" is hardly the most socially-equitable model 
imaginable. Finally, such identification assumes that a world-
wide coalition of individuals against environmental degradation 
will be identical with one of nation states pursuing the same 
purpose. But there may be a wide variety in the way states and 
individuals are affected (Finger 1992:224 ). Thus, by 
reinterpreting environmental politics within the general context 
of global environmental security, it becomes possible to show that: 
... environmental politics must be global in nature, which 
automatically leads to nation states being cast as the major 
actors in any solution to the global environmental crisis 
(Finger 1992:224). 
7.4 Social Movements and Grass-roots Action 
Shiva (1992), agrees with Finger that the word 'local' has been 
purposely written out of environmental concerns so that all 
environmental problems are portrayed as 'global' reqmnng 
'global' solutions. She, too, argues that institutions such as the 
World Bank are deliberately misleading in their analyses of 
environmental problems. Their concern is for a particular set of 
local and parochial interests which have become globalised 
through the scope of their reach (Shiva 1992:258). Concern for a 
'global environment' merely enables the globally powerful 
corporations and institutions to disguise their role m and 
responsibility for the destruction of the environment upon which 
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local communities depend. This occurs because the North's global 
reach allows it to extend into the South, while the South can only 
exist locally. For Shiv a then, the roots of the environmental crisis 
are located in the disempowerment of local communities, 
principally in the area of environmental decisionmaking where 
the trends have been to put control in the hands of governments 
and international institutions. The solution is to democratise 
international interests as well as national and local communities. 
"Global" controllers such as the World Bank, the IMF, GATT and 
other supra-national institutions represent a political space 
presently in command of an ecological one. They must be 
democratised and their activities made transparent. Ekins arrives 
at similar conclusions after noting a "common thrust" among all 
the new movements for social and economic change: 
... which can be represented by the same term: 
democratisation of knowledge, of development and of the 
state. It is a democratisation based on a new articulation of 
people-to-people and people-to-nature relation (Ekins 
1992:208). 
7.5 Hopeful Signs 
Because there is undoubtedly an urgent need for environmental 
solutions, the process of selecting the most approppriate form of 
action must canvass as many options as are available. But, as a 
precondition, it is vital to recognise the fallacy underlying market 
planetism; namely, that export promotion is the foundation for 
successful economic development. This western development 
model has been shown to benefit a specific class by making 
others dependent. It is both exploitative and inappropriate for 
the non-industrialised countries. Free trade policies mean the 
ultimate destruction of community loyalties for the dubious 
and the eventt1al loss of culturally-
specific customs and values. According to Morris, "never ~before 
have we so nakedly and publicly expressed the need for the 
planetary economy to destroy local cultures. More and more 
human relationships have been transformed into commercial 
transactions" (Morris 1990: 190). 
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Daly (1993 :26) has analysed the flawed logic underlying the 
orthodox economic drive for free international trade. For him the 
counting of all costs is an essential ingredient in all economic 
efficiency. He therefore agrees with those who urge nations to 
develop domestic programmes which internalise costs into prices. 
Problems arise when the same economists encourage countries to 
trade freely with others who have lower standards and 
externalise their costs (with lower pollution controls, worker 
safety, health care and wages): 
If a nation tries to follow both those policies, the conflict is 
clear: free competition between different cost-internalising 
regimes is utterly unfair (Daly 1993:26). 
[Therefore] the most practical solution is to permit nations 
that internalise costs to levy compensating tariffs on trade 
with nations that do not (Daly 1993:26) 
Economists such as Daly, notwithstanding their close association 
with the World Bank, are signs of hope even in the wake of 
development-led destruction. They. recognise the necessity for a 
shift from an archaic economic theory based on quantitative 
growth (throughput) to one of qualitative evolution which is the 
true meaning of development. 
Throughout the Third World there are many kindred groups 
locked in struggles for social change on many fronts. Sometimes 
they rely on traditionally-based forms, at other times they 
borrow and adapt from foreign sources. They are increasingly 
forming regional, national and international networks to pool their 
strengths and develop new strategies for survival in a hostile 
world order. This body of social movements ·and non-
governmental organisations is as vast as it is varied and has 
generated original ideas and innovative practices (Third World 
Guide 1990: 136). They range from trade unions for industrial 
workers in South Korea, to cooperatives in Kenya, to student 
movements for social reform in Myanmar and Sri lanka, to the 
indigenous forest groups of the Penan in Malaysia, to the Intifada 
resistance in occupied Palestine and many more. The most 
interesting steps are taking place in the villages and forests where 
women are leading movements to recover and defend traditional 
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cultures and the environment. In India, women are the leading 
participants in the movement of the Chipko people in the 
Himalayas. In Kenya, over 600 women's groups are planting trees 
m an effort to reafforest the denuded countryside (Third World 
Guide 1992:137). 
A good example of community action groups is the municipality of 
San Juan Mixtepec which lies in one of Mexico's most eroded rural 
areas and is home to some 35 Indian villages. Almost all of the. 
agricultural land has been degraded and depleted through 
intensive farming in the 1960s with chemical fertilisers and 
pesticides. People responded by migrating to other areas, mainly 
in the United States. But in 1986, groups of teachers and returned 
migrants began to address environmental and socio-economic 
problems and to recover those cultural aspects most directly 
linked to communal identity (Bluaert and Guidi 1992:284 ). The 
aim was to combine traditional agricultural knowledge with 
alternative technologies that were simple, low-cost and adapted to 
the local context. The farmers themselves would choose, apply 
and evaluate the alternatives they. considered were suitable for 
their situation. In spite of the modest size of the venture, it was 
thought essential to maintain total community control as much as 
possible, even avoiding the help of non government organisations. 
Whilst the San Juan Mixtepec project showed the effectiveness of 
small initiatives in solving practical problems by increasing 
opportunities for people to take control of their lives, the Union of 
Indigenous Communities of the Northern Ithmus (UCIZONI) 
demonstrated how local communities can defend themselves 
against oppression from loggers, settlers and cattle ranchers. 
Direct action (such as confiscation of logging machinery and 
blockading roads) and an alliance between Indian communities, 
grass-roots support organisations, environmentalists and 
academics has shown how the interrelated problems of race, class 
and environment can be successfully addressed by local people: 
[They] make clear that local people in Mexico do not perceive 
their crisis to be only "environmental" in the western sense. 
Whereas ecological factors such as soil erosion and 
deforestation are clearly important, it is falling production, 
lack of credit, a disadvantaged marketing system, repression, 
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insecurity of land tenure and threatened cultural 
environments which are their mam concerns (Blauert and 
Guidi 1992:288). 
The same voices are being heard from Siberia, where indigenous 
peoples such as the Yakuts, Khants, Mansis and Udege are caught 
between the Russian state and foreign timber companies from 
Korea, the United States and Japan. They have begun to set up 
independent political and social structures, such as the Association 
of Northern Minorities, "to unite all our strengths in order to 
survive" (Petrof 1992:270). 
Also seeking solidarity, on an international level, is the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) of Third World countries which had its 
origins in the Asian and Afro-Asian movements of the late 1940s 
and 1950s. This movement has survived the dissolution of the 
orthodox Cold War during which NAM members sought to retain 
their independence under pressure to align with one of the major 
camps. Today, members strongly assert that non-alignment has 
not become irrelevant merely because the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc has resulted in a unipolar world. Indeed, as Pannikar 
(1992:23) argues, under unipolarity, N AM unity is more crucial 
than ever. This is because "at no time in their history have Third 
World states faced such perils and have been so vulnerable to 
Northern pressures" and, despite their heterogeneity, they have 
little choice but to unite. In the words of Prime Minister Mahathir 
of Malaysia: 
Clearly from the list of violations of basic priciples of human 
rights and accepted international behaviour by the rich and 
the powerful, there is a need for us to go on and pool what 
little strength we have in order to avoid what amounts to a 
revival of the old Western colonialism (Mahathir 1992:26). 
In August 1992, 108 Non- .Aligned nations met for the 1Oth 
Summit in Jakarta to debate the important issues of disarmament, 
North-South dialogue, South-South cooperation, and environment 
and development. According to Raghavan (1992), Northern 
organisations have been impressed by the vigour of this latest 
NAM summit and have shown a preparedness to re-examine 
important development matters raised. Flexibility is a positiye 
sign in a dominant world order. 
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7.6 Signs of Despair: Structurally-adjusted Children 
It is very difficult to find many signs of hope in the cities of the 
South which are groaning under the pressure of exploding 
populations. Large numbers merely survive 1n appalling 
conditions of food shortages, widespread illness and high levels of 
human/industrial pollution. These are the mega-cities of the 
twenty-first century, already here. By mid-1992, the world 
population was 5.48 billion people and the six billion mark will be 
reached by 1998 (Third World Guide 199311994:31). 
Overpopulation predominantly afflicts poor countries and IS a 
symptom of underdevelopment, poverty and dependency. As 
always, children are the main victims: 
Each day, across the globe, 40,000 children under the age of 
five die of malnutrition and ordinary diseases, 150 million 
children survive with health problems and growth 
deficiencies, and 100 million children between the ages of six 
and eleven never attend school (Third World Guide 
93/94:36). 
UNICEF estimates that at least one million African children died in 
the 1980s from debt-related deprivation. Malnutrition alone in 
1988 was the cause of death of 500,000 children in developing 
countries (Jolly 1989:52). Forced structural adjustment on the 40 
poorest countries in the world (by the World Bank and the IMP) 
has resulted in a net flow of $19 billion from those countries 
(Godlee 1993:8) who ought to be receiving help to feed their 
starving populations. For many of the indebted sub-saharans 
feeding their children must take second place to growing cash 
crops for the export market. Yet the World Bank continues to 
make unrealistic claims for the health benefits of structural 
adjustment policies (Godlee 1993:8) which are disputed by all the 
main aid agencies: 
According to Unicef, Christian Aid, and save the Children, the 
absence of substantial increases in children mortality has 
nothing to do with structural adjustment. Rather it suggests 
that better vaccination coverage, oral rehydration therapy, 
and community health initiatives have balanced out the 
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effects of food shortage, economic stagnation and AIDS 
(Godlee 1993:9). 
From any perspective it Is absurd to immunise the Third World's 
children on the one hand and starve them on the other. 
The structural adjustment policies of international lenders have 
also made children a useful commodity. They are increasingly 
forced into unbearable working conditions to minimise production 
costs in competitive markets. It is claimed that: 
In Africa, one in five children work, in some countries in 
Latin America, the figure is one in four children; in Brasil, 
seven million children earn their own living. In 1991, 71 
unmarked cemeteries were found in Peru containing the 
corpses of dozens of children who had been exploited in the 
gold mines (Third World Guide 93/94:36). 
It is ironic as Daly (1993:26) has noted that, while GATT has 
specified restrictions on countries exploiting prison labour, it 
makes no such restrictions for child labour. 
Children are also traded for fresh organs and sold to rich Northern 
citizens. In Honduras and Brazil this growing business with the 
US is called a "body-traffic industry" (Chomsky 1992: 220-221; 
Queseda 1993:41). In many Asian cities children form the 
primary products in growing sex industries catering for the tastes 
of First World tourists. 
If such a commodity as international justice was really available 
m a civilised world order (one proclaiming the high value of 
human rights), then not only would many of the Third World's 
debts be declared forfeit according to international law, but 
Nuremberg trials would be held and reparations required from 
those individuals and institutions who have waged the 'real' Cold 
War against the lives and conditions for life in the undefended 
places. It is time to re-asess George Bush's proclamation of a New 
World Order, in which he foresaw the coming of a new era of 
peace and justice. Beginning with the Gulf War in 1990, the world 
has seen exactly the reverse, a new world nightmare in which the 
reassertion of the old order is unilaterally driven by the United 
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States. For the rule of law, has been substituted the law of the 
'free market' and justice the prerogative of the rich. 
7.7 The Future? 
A recession facilitates the transfer of wealth from those at the 
lowest rungs of the economic ladder to those above. As already 
noted, this has been the agenda of the Right since the 1930s and 
has penetrated the policies of western governments and major 
lenders (Corbridge 1992:287 -288). A 'successful' conclusion of 
the recent GATT negotitions was expected to accelerate this 
process by forcing reluctant countries to 'accept the dictates of the 
international capital markets' (World Bank 1989:24) and reducing 
government intervention and central planning (World Bank 
1985:1 ). This will continue to weaken the political/economic 
position of the South, and renew the onslaught on diminishing 
environmental resources. It is therefore possible to discern a 
disturbing pattern of events which suggests unprecedented social, 
political and economic turmoil in the years ahead, including 
renewed super-power rivalry and resource wars against the Third 
World. These will probably coincide with serious environmental 
and climatic disruptions as ecological systems continue to 
deteriorate. According to Myers (1986:253) the world has 
already begun to see the appearance of "environmental refugees", 
in the wake of ecological breakdown where: 
people feel obliged to leave their homelands because of 
declining means of livelihood, which in turn stems from 
environmental degradation. The immediate cause may often 
appear in the form of military activity. But the underlying 
cause may have more to do with deterioration of the local-
natural resource base and its capacity to support the citizenry 
(Myers 1986:253) 
There are obvious examples such as the five million Ethiopians 
displaced since 1970, a large proportion of which has moved into 
neighbouring countries and increased the area's instability. In 
many other Third World countries environmental factors (causing 
food and water shortages) have been contributory factors in 
triggering civil disorders, insurgencies, military outbreaks and 
downfall of governments. Environmental deficiencies have 
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implications for international relations where they can not only 
contribute to conflict, but also stimulate the growing use of force 
to repress disaffection among populations suffering from the 
consequences of natural systems decline. 
Action to avoid widespread world systems collapse will be 
unlikely to come from the industrialised rich nations irrationally 
preoccupied with great power status and economic advantage. A 
mere $50 million a year was not available for the Ethiopian Anti-
deserification Plan in the early 1970s (Myers 1986:252) to avoid 
the subsequent regional tragedy. 
The West has shown itself impervious to moral suasion and 
human suffering. It will continue to ignore its share of 
responsibility for Third World debt and destitution in spite of the 
mounting evidence that the way out of negative development is 
debt and interest relief. This relief cannot be disguised by the 
'bankspeak' of a Baker and a Brady Plan or the 'conditionalities' of 
global lenders. Poor countries simply cannot manage their 
economies successfully whilst they are drained of foreign 
exchange and resources. No western country would ever be 
expected to comply with such conditions: 
The truth is that the advice being tendered by the IMF and 
the World Bank to countries now passing under their 
economic tutelage never has been, and never is, adopted by 
the rich countries when it does not suit their purposes 
(Seabrook 1992:26). 
The developing world must also be allowed relief from the hordes 
of aid and development organisations which have served 
themselves m the name of development during the ·last half-
century: 
In that notorious cmo of parasites and hangers-on made up of 
the United Nations, the World Bank and the bilateral agencies, 
it is aid - and nothing else - which has in some cases 
facilitated the most consistent and grievous abuse of human 
rights that have occurred anywhere in the world since the 
dark ages (Hancock 1991:193). 
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Without a chance for a viable existence, the interconnected fates 
of developing countries and the world environment are now in 
jeopardy. A selective and self-interested world order ignores this 
at its peril. Yet there are solutions. People need to regain power 
over the political and economic institutions presently in control of 
the 'global village'. Political power needs to be recaptured and 
realigned and its institutions made accountable. There must be a 
redefinition of 'development', poverty and unforgiven debt in 
terms of social equity and human rights. Extricating poor 
countries from the western debt trap is a global health priority 
especially because of the way it impacts on children: 
Worldwide, the number of underweight children has risen 
from 21 million in 1980 to 30 million in 1989 (Godlee 
1993:9). 
The importance of the links between local production and 
consumption need to be recognised and reestablished. The world 
can no longer afford the excesses of an order which relies on the 
wasteful exploitation of people and natural resources. The 
current order must give way to ·an efficient and socially-just 
ecological one. Small groups, communities and social movements 
that have shown a capacity to overturn not only regimes, but 
empires are a sign of hope - albeit a dim one. Given the 
constraints of systemic barbarism and environmental time, these 
groups remain the only realistic prospect. 
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